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BEYOND PAYNE: THE CASE FOR A LEGALLY
ENFORCEABLE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION

IN CIVIL CASES FOR INDIGENT
CALIFORNIA LITIGANTS
PART ONE: THE LEGAL ARGUMENTSt
by Earl Johnson, Jr.*

&

Elizabeth Schwartz**
[lImperfect as was the ancient common-law system, harsh as it was
in many of its methods and measures, it would strike one with
surprise to be credibly informed that the common-law courts ...
shut their doors upon ...

poorsuitors ....

Even greaterwould be

the reproach to the system of jurisprudenceof the state of California
if it could be truly declared that in this twentieth century ...
said the same thing ....
I
I.

it had

INTRODUCTION

This is, as the title suggests, an advocacy piece, rather than a dry
recitation of pros and cons. But there is a reason.
Some propositions are so elemental and some developments so long
overdue that once implemented most Americans wonder how democratic
society could have functioned any other way. Women's suffrage, the
elimination of de jure racial discrimination and the right to counsel for
indigent felony defendants are among these phenomena. In this article,
we treat another fundamental right, as yet unrealized, which in retrospect
probably will appear self-evident and preordained. That is the right to
counsel, or more accurately, to appropriate representation, in civil cases.
t A second part to this article focusing on some of the factors which have prevented
recognition of a right to counsel for indigents in civil cases will appear in volume II,
number 4 of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
* B.A. (Northwestern); J.D. (University of Chicago); LL.M. (Northwestern). Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center; Senior Research Associate,
University of Southern California Social Science Research Institute; Director, Program
for the Study of Dispute Resolution Policy, University of Southern California.
** B.A. (Vassar College); J.D. (University of Southern California). Member of the
California Bar; Formerly Research Assistant, Program for the Study of Dispute Resolution Policy, University of Southern California.
1. Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 294, 168 P. 135, 137 (1917).
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At some point, Americans will look back and ask how concepts like
"due process," "equal protection of the law" and "equal justice under
law" were anything but hollow phrases, while our society still tolerated
the denial of counsel to low-income civil litigants.
We are focusing on California in this article because for various
reasons this state appears to offer an unusually hospitable environment,
in doctrinal terms, for the creation of such a right. Yet, the logic of this
article and many of the individual arguments made apply in other American jurisdictions as well.
Four independent and sufficient grounds for such a legally enforceable
right to counsel are considered. First, in California a right to counsel can
be predicated on the common law. 2 The state explicitly absorbed the
English common law and equity principles as they existed in 1850 when
the state constitution was adopted, and at that time, there was a clear,
legally enforceable right to free counsel for indigent English citizens in
civil litigation.
Alternatively, constitutional due process3 appears to require the provision of free counsel to low-income people whose problems necessitate
recourse to the complexities of litigation in the regular courts. California
appellate judges already have construed due process to embrace the right
to be represented by counsel in civil as well as criminal cases. The
remaining step--to mandate appointment of free counsel for those unable
to afford their own-is supported by both doctrinal and empirical considerations.
Third, equal protection4 of the laws offers an independent ground for a
legally enforceable right to counsel. Contrary to United States Supreme
Court rulings, poverty already has been deemed a suspect classification
by the California courts. Moreover, there is a fundamental interest in
protecting one's rights in the courts. Thus, the strict scrutiny test must be
applied to the denial of counsel to those unable to afford lawyers. Even if
a middle standard of substantial relation to an important state purpose
were invoked, the failure to provide lawyers to indigent civil litigants
would violate the equal protection clause.
Finally, the most far-reaching rationale is built around a constitutional
2. See text accompanying nofes 6-41 infra for a discussion of the absorption of the
common law into California law.
3. See text accompanying notes 42-131 infra for a discussion of federal and state due
process.

4. See text accompanying notes 132-93 infra for a discussion and application of equal
protection analysis.
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right to equal justice.5 Emanations from several constitutional provisions
including the first amendment and the due process and equal protection
clauses appear to imply the existence of such a right which, in turn,
places an affirmative burden on government to insure that its disputeresolving forums offer its citizens a substantially fair and equal hearing.
In the regular courts, that right ordinarily can be implemented only
through supplying low income people with free counsel.
In Part Two, to be published in a forthcoming issue of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review, we address what we perceive to be the
practical and psychological factors that thus far have impeded the recognition of what seems an obvious fundamental right. We speculate that
judges have several concerns. They fear inundation of the courts. They
anticipate frivolous claims and defenses. They are reluctant to burden
their fellow members of the bar with the obligation to represent poor
people. And they may wish to avoid imposing an inflexible lawyerdominated adversary model on the dispute resolution process.
Some of these concerns seem unrealistic; none are so grave as to
excuse the denial of equal justice; all can be minimized by artful design
of the legally enforceable right. We advocate the creation of a right to the
kind of representation which is appropriate to the nature of the proceeding. In some instances, this will require provision of a lawyer; for other
tribunals, lay advocates may be sufficient. Legislatures may even
construct some forums in which representation of any sort is inappropriate. There is nothing to prevent courts from articulating a right flexible
enough to encompass all of these possibilities. However, before these
concerns are addressed, we must first demonstrate the sound legal foundation which mandates that indigent civil litigants be provided with
counsel.
I.

THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION

The reasoning and precedents establishing the existence of a common
law right to free counsel for indigent litigants in California are unusually
persuasive. The argument is a straightforward syllogism:
A. The common law of England, including equity and statutory
provisions, as that law existed in 1850, defines the minimal
rights enjoyed by indigent civil litigants in California.
B. The common law of England in 1850 afforded indigent civil
litigants the right to the assistance of free counsel under both
equity and statutory provisions.
5. See text accompanying notes 194-216 infra for a discussion of the broad constitutional principles mandating free counsel.
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C.

Consequently, indigent civil litigants in California enjoy a right
to the assistance of free counsel.
A. The first of these propositions is amply supported by prior decisions dating back to Martin v. Superior Court.6 That decision involved
the issue of whether indigent civil litigants possessed a right to proceed
without prepayment of court fees. The California Supreme Court held
that such a right existed despite the fact that no California statute
expressly provided for waiver of court costs. The court found this right in
the English common law as that law existed in 1850 and ruled that
7
Political Code section 4468, the predecessor of Civil Code section 22.2,
"makes the common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to nor
inconsistent with our constitution and laws, the rule of decision in all the
courts of this state." 8 The Martin court defined the scope of the English
common law, which had become the rule of decision in the California
courts, as "the whole body of that jurisprudence as it stood, influenced
by statute, at the time when the code section was adopted. And more than
that, that it embraced also

.

. .the great handmaiden and coadjutor of

the common law, equity." 9
In subsequent cases, California courts have held repeatedly that
California absorbed the English common law and that the common law
which was absorbed embraced equity and statutory law as well as the
decisions of the law courts. 10 Moreover, the California courts have
continued to define the rights of indigent California litigants on the basis
of whether indigents possessed those rights under the English common
law, statutory or otherwise. In County of Sutter v. Superior Court,"I the

court of appeal confronted the issue of whether indigent plaintiffs were
entitled to an exemption from a statutory provision requiring the deposit
of a cost bond in lawsuits against public entities. The court held that
California indigents were entitled to an exemption from these bonds,
since under an early British statute security for costs was waived as well
as fees suspended, and California's absorption of the common law
included not only common law jurisprudence in general but also its then
6. 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
7. CAL. CIv. CODE § 22.2 (West 1954). This statute provides: "The common law of
England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all courts of this
State." Id.
8. 176 Cal. at 292, 168 P. at 136.
9. Id. at 293, 168 P. at 136-37.
10. E.g., People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283,286-87,231 P.2d 832,835
(1951); Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal. 2d 835, 838, 118 P.2d 1, 4 (1941); People v.
Richardson, 138 Cal. App. 404, 408, 32 P.2d 433, 435 (1934).
11. 244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 53 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1966).
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existing statutory modifications. 12 Similarly, the California Supreme
Court in Ferguson v. Keays, t 1 ruled that California indigents were

entitled to a waiver of appellate fees on the specific grounds that "several
English cases prior to 1850 . . . had expressly recognized such a

right." 14
B. From the above discussion, it is rather clear that the California
courts have settled that the rights of indigent California civil litigants
must be determined by examining English common law (including English statutes and English equity as well as the decisions of the law courts)
to ascertain whether the right at issue was afforded to indigent English
litigants. The California Supreme Court has not yet ruled whether the
right to free counsel existed under the common law of England prior to
1850. Nonetheless, our research of this question indicates that this right
had been guaranteed under English statutes and equity principles for
several centuries before California became a state.
A statute of Henry VII, which was the primary source of in forma
pauperis rights in England from 1495 until 1883, expressly granted
indigent litigants a right to free counsel:
And after the seid writte or writtes be retorned, ...

the Justices

.. .shall assigne to the same pou psone or psones Councell lerned
by their discrecions which shall geve their Councelles nothing taking
for the same, and 'in like wise the same Justices shall appoynte
attorney and attorneyes for the same pou psone and psones
which shall doo their duties without any rewardes. . . *15

. .

.

The supreme court in Martin was well aware that the English common
law embraced a right to free counsel. In describing the applicable in
forma pauperis provisions, the court quoted the following summary from
Blackstone's Commentaries: "And paupers . . .are by statute.
have . . . counsel and attorney assigned them without fee . ..

. .

to

",16

After 1495 the law courts adopted an anomalous interpretation of this
12. The court reasoned as follows:
California's adoption of the "common law" embraced common law jurisprudence in
general, including its existent statutory modifications. . . .In the reign of Henry I
(1100-1135) an ordinance requiring security was mitigated for the poor by a provision
"that those who had not sufficient present security should pledge their faith to make
satisfaction to the utmost of their power." . - . The authorities justify the conclusion that the common-law power embraced waiver of'security for costs as well as
suspension of fees.
Id. at 774, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
13. 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971).
14. Id. at 654, 484 P.2d at 73, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
15. Statute of Henry VII, 1495, 11 Hen. 7, c. 7, 2 Statutes of the Realm 578 (transcribed
in 2 Statutes at Large 85) (repealed 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49), reprintedin S. POLLOCK,
LEGAL AID-THE FIRST 25 YEARS 10 (1975).

16. 176 Cal. at 294, 168 P. at 137.
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statute of Henry VII holding that in forma pauperis relief (including the
appointment of free counsel) was to be available only to civil plaintiffs
and not to civil defendants. 17 However, California like England 8 has
abandoned this distinction and affords in forma pauperis rights to civil
defendants and plaintiffs alike. Ferguson v. Keays t9 and Roberts v.
Superior Court,2" for instance, both involved defendants. There is no

more reason to confine the right of free counsel to civil plaintiffs than
there would be to so limit other forms of in forma pauperis relief.
But there is also more direct authority in the English common law for
extending this relief to indigent civil defendants. Sometime in the sixteenth century and independent of statute, English equity courts created
their own right to free counsel for indigent litigants, one which specifically embraced civil defendants. In 1845, the Lord Chamberlain described
the practice in equity as follows:
The right to sue in formd pauperisoriginated in the statute of Hen. 7.
This and the subsequent statutes of Hen. 8 are confined to actions in

the Courts of Common Law, and do not extend to Defendants. The
Courts of Equity have adopted the principle of these statutes, and,

proceedingfurther, have extended the relief to the case of the Defend21
ants.

These in forma pauperis rights in equity courts embraced a right to free
counsel. A leading treatise on English equity courts defines in forma
pauperis in those tribunals as "an arrangement whereby the court assigned to poor suitors their counsel and attorneys free of charge and allowed
them their process without charge." 2 2 This relief was available to civil
defendants as well as civil plaintiffs. In fact, "until the last decade of
Elizabeth's reign in forma pauperis [in equity] was regarded as being
17. Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REv. 361, 375-76 (1923). In an
unreported decision, the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court seized
upon this historical practice in the English common law courts to justify the denial of the
common law right to counsel to an indigent civil defendant. (The contrary practices in
England's equity courts were not brought to the attention of the Appellate Department.)
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Slade, Civ. No. A12774 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (mem. opinion),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The opinion carried a strong
negative pregnant that such a common law right to counsel does exist for an indigent
California plaintiff.
18. After decades of criticism this interpretation yielded in England when in 1883 a
new set of court rules extended in forma pauperis relief, including the right to free
counsel, to civil defendants. Maguire, supra note 17, at 376, 380.
19. 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971) (waiver of appellate fees).
20. 264 Cal. App. 2d 235, 70 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1968) (waiver of appeal bond).
21. Oldfield v. Cobbett, 41 Eng. Rep. 765, 766 (1845) (emphasis added).
22. W.J. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY 501 (1967); see also id. at 32428, describing the in forma pauperis procedures in equity court for assigning counsel to
indigents.
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essentially for defendants whereas pauper plaintiffs were expected to go
to the court of Requests. 23
C. The same reasoning which led the California Supreme Court to
hold that indigent plaintiffs were entitled to waiver of trial court costs in
Martin and that indigent respondents were entitled to waiver of appellate
fees in Ferguson seems to lead inescapably to the conclusion that indigent litigants possess a common law right to appointment of free counsel.
As in Martin and Ferguson, the right in question was part of the English
common law at the time California became a state and thus becomes the
rule of decision in California courts.
As indicated above, 24 the California Supreme Court has not yet
confronted this syllogism. But in Hunt v. Hackett25 one California Court
of Appeal did consider the issue. Interestingly, the opinion in Hackett
does not challenge directly any of the above premises. Rather, the court
asserts that English common law is irrelevant because "current and past
practice of California courts is compelling authority for the ruling of the
trial court in this case.' '26 Yet the only decision cited in support of this
proposition-Fergusonv. Keays2 7 -fails to establish any current or past
practice disallowing a common law right to free counsel. Evidently the
court of appeal in Hackett attempts to draw its conclusion from language
in Ferguson which reserves the question "whether indigents must be
given funds by the county . . . in .order to pay . . . third-party

charges. '28
The reliance on the cited language from Ferguson appears inappropriate for several reasons. First, the supreme court in Ferguson did not
have the issue of appointment of counsel before it. 29 Second, it only
reserved and did not decide the question of whether indigents must be
given funds for various third party charges. 30 Third, attorneys can be
provided to indigent civil litigants without requiring other funds since
23. Id. at 327.
24. See text following note 14 supra.
25. 36 Cal. App. 3d 134, 111 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974)
(indigent defendant denied right to appointment of free counsel). It should be noted that
one of the co-authors, Johnson, was lead counsel at all levels of appeal for the appellants
and petitioners in this case.
26. Id. at 138, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
27. 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971).
28. Id. at 654, 484 P.2d at 72, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 400. The discussion of Ferguson by the
court in Hackett is found at 36 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 111 Cal. Rptr: at 457-58.
29. The issue before the court was whether or not it had the inherent power to waive its
own fees in appellate cases. 4 Cal. 3d at 654, 484 P.2d at 71, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
30. 4 Cal. 3d at 654, 484 P.2d at 72, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
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lawyers can be appointed to serve without compensation in fulfillment of
their duties as officers of the court. 3' And finally, Ferguson actually
31. The state also apparently assumes that if this court orders counsel appointed in
certain cases, it will mandate that counsel be paid from public funds. We do not assert
such power. If and how counsel will be compensated is for the Legislature to decide.
Until that body determines that appointed counsel may be compensated from public
funds in civil cases, attorneys must serve gratuitously in accordance with their
statutory duty not to reject "the cause of the defenseless or oppressed." (Bus. &
Prof. Code § 6068, subd. (h).)
Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908,920 n.6, 553 P.2d 565,574 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405,
414 n.6 (1976). See also Lamont v. Solano County, 49 Cal. 158 (1874); Rowe v. Yuba City,
17 Cal. 61 (1860).
There is some language in two rather recent court of appeal decisions suggesting that the
policy of the present day may require that appointed counsel be compensated at public
expense. See Polakovic v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 3d 69, 104 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1972)
and Luke v. County of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 495, 74 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1969). Payne
appears to have resolved this issue, however, against the compensation of appointed
lawyers in civil cases.
In any event, it seems doubtful that any public policy favoring the payment of appointed
lawyers out of public funds would be allowed to defeat a much more ancient and
fundamental public policy-that poor people have the assistance of free counsel in civil
litigation. The legal profession's interest in being compensated for the relatively small
percentage of cases in which counsel would be appointed certainly is not superior to the
interest of the poor population in exercising its common law right to counsel so as to
protect its rights and property.
Among other things, a contrary conclusion would fly in the face of the public policy
implemented in the legal profession's own Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which
recites: "Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload,
should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of free legal
services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each
lawyer.... .- ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-25
(1975). It would be anomolous to state that lawyers are required to render uncompensated
legal services to the poor but then hold that common law in forma pauperis rights do not
extend to legal counsel because third party public payments must be made to appointed
lawyers.
The California Supreme Court has at least three options. It could continue to uphold
Payne, Lamont and Rowe and deny appointed lawyers compensation in any case where
such payment is not expressly authorized by statute. In that instance, the Hackett court's
objection to recognizing a right which requires public payment of litigation expenses
simply evaporates. Second, the court could decide that in most circumstances lawyers
who are appointed to represent people are entitled to receive public compensation as a
matter of public policy, but that that right must yield when its exercise would impede the
existence of more important rights. Assuming common law in forma pauperis rights do not
justify third party payments, attorneys would not be compensated from public funds when
representing low-income people exercising their common law right to counsel (unless and
until the legislature authorized such expenditures). Third, the court could simultaneously recognize the long standing inchoate common law right to free counsel for poor people
and the new "public policy right" to compensation for those lawyers who are appointed to
provide the required representation.
Certainly, had the California Supreme Court already declared the right to counsel, the
announcement of a new right to compensation for appointed lawyers would not suddenly
disenfranchise poor people of their common law right to free counsel. Rather, the new
right would constitute an independent determination that this particular form of "third
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supports the proposition that the rights of an indigent California civil
litigant to appointment of counsel are determined by reference to the
32
rights of such litigants under English common law. As observed earlier,
the court in Ferguson based its conclusion that appellate fees are to be
waived for California litigants on a finding that the common law, incorporated into California law, permitted indigents to appeal in forma
pauperis.
The only other explanation we can conceive for the reference to
"current and past practice of California courts" is that since no California court has yet appointed counsel in civil cases, current and past
practice has established that such a right does not exist. If that is the
intent of the statement, it appears to be an improper inference from the
absence of prior recognition of this right. As a matter of logic, the past
failure to appoint counsel does not seem to dispose of the question of
whether there is a right to free counsel any more than the failure to waive
appellate fees prior to 1971 precluded the California Supreme Court from
resolving that issue in favor of indigent litigants in Ferguson."
A more serious reservation about the common law theory flows from
its apparent breadth and rigidity. On its face, a right to counsel predicated
on the common law seems absolute and comprehensive: there is no
balancing of complexity versus cost nor close examination of the significance of the interests at stake, as might take place under a constitutional
theory.34 If the litigant is poor and the dispute is in the judicial forum,
then he or she apparently would be entitled to free counsel. Certainly the
California courts currently do not limit other forms of in forma pauperis
relief to "significant" disputes or "complex" proceedings. This consideration has led at least one commentator to conclude that the courts
will not adopt the common law approach to the right to counsel issue:
party" litigation expense was a proper charge on the public revenues. It would be entirely
appropriate for the court to recognize both of these rights at the same time. What would be
of dubious rationality is a declaration of a right to compensation for appointed lawyers
that renders "impossible" the recognition of the centuries old common law right to free
counsel for poor people on some theory that the common law right does not extend to
those forms of litigation expense which require public payments to third parties. That
would be a "reverse bootstraps" argument-in this instance pulling poor people down
with the legal profession's bootstraps.
32. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
33. The court's inherent power to waive its filing fees was announced for the first time
by the California Supreme Court in Ferguson. 4 Cal. 3d at 652, 484 P.2d at 71, 94 Cal.
Rptr. at 399.
34. As for example, the balancing of interests consideration which often constitutes the
court's rationale in due process cases. See Bice, Standardsof JudicialReview Under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 711 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bice]; citations note 42 infra.
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Despite its historical and analytical soundness, adoption by the
California Supreme Court of a common law right to appointed
counsel in civil cases is unlikely. .

.

. [I]mposition on the judicial

system of a right to free counsel in civil actions would be a matter of
presently indeterminable, but probably substantial, cost. The infirmity of the common law rationale is that it does not permit a gradual
application by limited extensions following one on the other, thereby
allowing the judicial system to absorb the impact with minimal
dislocation. By its nature the common law argument, if accepted,
would confer a right to counsel on all indigent litigants in all civil
magnitude, which the
cases, a step of extraordinary, if uncertain,
35
take.
to
decline
probably
will
courts
A full discussion of the practicality of a comprehensive right to
counsel in civil cases must await Part Two of this article. But there are
certain aspects of the above position that are so unique to the common
law theory and the viability of that argument that we will take them up at
this point.
At the outset, it should be recognized that England has lived with a
common law right to counsel of this dimension for four and one-half
centuries. 36 Germany has survived with a comprehensive statutory right
since 1871,37 Sweden's similar guarantee dates from 1919,38 Italy's from
1923, 39 and France's from 1851.40 Similarly, Switzerland's constitutional right to counsel in civil cases has existed for over forty years. 4 1 Thus,
even assuming the common law approach mandates an absolute, compre-

hensive right, there is ample precedent that a legal system can accommodate this full stride toward equal justice. Nor does it seem inevitable that
California must inch its way toward the same destination most western
democracies reached decades or centuries ago.
But we can also approach this question from another direction. Is the
35. Comment, Current Prospectsfor an Indigent's Right to Appointed Counsel and a
Free Transcriptin Civil Litigation, 7 PAC. L.J. 149, 166 (1976).
36. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
37. The right to legal assistance in civil litigation was well established in Germany
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This right was carried through the civil
procedure laws of the individual German states and, with the founding of the second
empire in 1871, this right was embodied in the National Code of Civil Procedure, which
remains in effect today. See Klauser & Riegert, Legal Assistance in the FederalRepublic
of Germany, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 583, 584-85 (1971).
38. Ginsburg & Bruzelius, ProfessionalLegal Assistance in Sweden, 11 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 997, 1021 n.14 (1962).
39. M. CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY, & E. JOHNSON, JR., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID INMODERN SOCIETIES 33 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE].

40. Id. at 39.
41. See note 214 infra and accompanying text.
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common law approach truly less flexible than a constitutional rationale
would be? In one very crucial sense, obviously not. A common law
right, unlike a constitutional right, can be modified by a simple legislative act. Consequently, once the California Supreme Court held that lowincome civil litigants possessed a comprehensive right to free counsel
under the common law, the initiative would shift to the state legislature to
shape that right. It could enact laws abridging the right entirely or
expanding it to other forums, such as administrative agency tribunals, not
encompassed in the common law right as it was inherited from England
in 1850.
More likely, California's legislators would take a middle path,
confirming the right for certain litigants and/or litigation, abridging it for
others and extending it to some not protected by the common law. The
essential point is that the legislature would be free to redesign the civil
right to counsel, if and only if the courts frame it as a common law right
rather than as a constitutional mandate.
It is not at all unreasonable to anticipate that some California judges
would prefer that route. The onus would thus be thrust upon another
branch of government, the legislature. This may have special appeal
because it is the legislature that ultimately will have to consider whether
to fund the right. With a common law ruling emanating from the
judiciary, the lawmakers would be in a position to determine the dimensions of the right they were financing from the public treasury. Thus, the
courts might well prefer a comprehensive right to counsel predicated on
the easily modified common law rationale, to a narrow right irretrievably
enshrined as an inflexible constitutional requirement.
III. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES
The constitutional arguments for a civil right to counsel, unlike the
common law rationale, have already been the subject of considerable
scholarly attention. 42 For the most part, of course, the focus has been on
actual or projected federal court interpretations of the United States
Constitution, not on how the California Supreme Court might rule. In
contrast, we will only summarize the general theories as background for
discussion of the status of these constitutional rights in the State of
California.
42. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322
(1966); Note, The Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 989
(1975); Comment, Current Prospectsfor an Indigent's Right to Appointed Counsel and a
Free Transcriptin Civil Litigation, 7 PAC. L.J. 149 (1976); Note, The Emerging Right of
Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 554 (1976);
Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
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To some extent, a comprehensive right to counsel for California's civil
litigants can be viewed as the logical conclusion of a historical progression that started in the federal courts but has been accelerated by
constitutional interpretations in the California courts. Since 1963,
throughout the United States, criminal defendants accused of a felony

have enjoyed a constitutional right to counsel at government expense if
they are too poor to retain their own attorney.43 In 1972 this right was
expanded to protect a criminal defendant from even one day's imprisonment if he is denied the assistance of counsel at trial. 44 And decades
earlier, the United States Supreme Court had recognized that the right to
a hearing was frequently
useless without the right to the assistance of a
45
lawyer at that hearing.
The United States Supreme Court has also stated that a judicial process
violates due process when it erects economic barriers to access by certain
civil litigants.' In particular instances, other courts have afforded poor
people the right to appointed counsel in civil cases. 47 And in California, a
right to be heard with counsel has attained compelling stature for one
class of indigent civil defendants: those who are imprisoned at the time of
suit. 48 As a result, the California Supreme Court appears to be tottering
on the edge of the next logical step-to mandate appointment of free
49
counsel for all indigent civil litigants as a matter of constitutional right.
A. The Due Process Theme in the Federal Courts
The procedural due process test traverses two inquiries: is a depriva43. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). The Court, however, refused to
consider the extension of the right to counsel to cases in which "loss of liberty" was not at
issue. Id.
45. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932).
46. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (waiver of filing fees for indigents
seeking to obtain a divorce).
47. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976). The
court in Payne stated that an indigent prisoner who is denied the opportunity to appear in a
civil action may also be denied due process if counsel is not appointed, since this may be
the only way for the prisoner to obtain access to the courts. Id. at 924, 553 P.2d at 576-77,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
In a case subsequently withdrawn from publication, an indigent father was appointed
counsel in a proceeding to declare his son free from the father's custody and control. In re
David K., 28 Cal. App. 3d 1061 (1972) (Advance Sheet), opinion deleted on direction of
the California Supreme Court by order dated January 12, 1973.
48. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 924, 553 P.2d 565, 576-77, 132 Cal. Rptr.
405, 416-17 (1976).
49. The California Supreme Court was given an opportunity to decide the issue but
failed to do so in Hunt v. Hackett, 36 Cal. App. 3d 134, III Cal. Rptr. 456 (1973) (petition
for hearing denied Feb. 14, 1974 by the California Supreme Court, Civ. No. 40991), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974).
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tion of liberty or property threatened, and if so, is the individual affected
afforded a meaningful opportunity to be h~ard? 5° Although there is some
evidence that the United States Supreme Court is narrowing its conception of what constitutes liberty or property, 5 this is not a major concern
at this stage of the development of a due-process right to counsel. Most

judicial proceedings involve disputes over what any court would denominate as property or liberty. We need not extend the constitutional principle beyond these familiar categories to establish a nearly comprehensive
and very meaningful right to counsel.

But what is particularly relevant is the shifting line drawn in different
constitutional cases as to what constitutes a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. The opinions have certainly suggested that deprivation of a lesser

interest can be accomplished constitutionally with a lesser hearing. 2 And
an argument could be made that only when an indigent's liberty (as

opposed to property) is threatened by an adverse decision in a dispute
will the hearing require that the indigent be provided with a free at53
torney.
Yet a contrary conclusion can be drawn from the federal cases in
which the significance of the deprivation is the focal point. For instance,

in criminal cases extending to accused misdemeanants the procedural
protections afforded to accused felons, the Court has suggested that the

distinction between imprisonment (i. e., liberty) and a fine (i. e., property) is irrelevant to an indigent's right to certain services free of charge. 4
50. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576-79 (1975); Bice, supra note 34, at 711.
51. Bice, supra note 34, at 713; Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property",62 CORNELL
L. REV. 405 (1977). Two recent decisions supporting the thesis are Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976) (state circular describing plaintiff as active shoplifter did not deprive him of
liberty or property rights) and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (due process rights of
city employee not violated by termination under a city ordinance without a pretermination
hearing).
52. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-84 (1975) (in the school discipline
situation the thoroughness and procedural protections in the required hearing vary with
the seriousness of the sanction to be imposed); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378
(1971) (as a general rule the "formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary,
depending upon the importance of the interests involved").
53. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (broad rule requiring the appointment
of counsel to indigent misdemeanant defendants was expressly limited to cases in which
imprisonment and not merely a fine could be imposed); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967)
(appointment of counsel for accused juveniles was justified on grounds they may be
"subjected to the loss of liberty for years").
54. In holding that an indigent convicted of a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine
was entitled to the same right to free transcripts as a similarly situated felon, the Court
stated the following: "The practical effects of conviction of even petty offenses of the
kind involved here are not to be minimized. A fine may bear as heavily on an indigent
accused as forced confinement." Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971).
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the Court highlighted the

artificiality of the distinction between property and liberty:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right
... .In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the
personal right to liberty and the personal
right in property. Neither
56
could have meaning without the other.
In justifying the extension of free counsel to indigent criminal defendants who may suffer even one day's imprisonment, federal courts have
looked primarily to the social consequences which may result from such
a punishment. For example, Argersinger v. Hamlin57 emphasized the
social disruption that may accompany even a brief jail term.58 Yet the
consequences of an adverse civil judgment may be as detrimental or even
more devastating than the consequences of a fine or relatively short
imprisonment. Under California law, for example, a civil judgment may
be implemented through a levy of execution on the judgment debtor's
wages,5 9 bank accounts,6° personal property or even real property on
which the judgment debtor's house is situated. 61 And should a judgment
debtor fail to appear at proceedings supplemental to execution 62 (in which
a judgment creditor seeks discovery of the debtor's assets) he can be
arrested and imprisoned.63 One empirical study found that nineteen
percent of those who have their wages garnished lose their jobs, fortynine percent suffer adverse health consequences, thirty-four percent
suffer serious family disruptions, and nine percent find themselves involved in divorce or separation. 64 Thus, collection techniques currently
55. 405 U.S. 537 (1972).
56. Id. at 552.
57. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
58. Id. at 37 n.6 (the Court noting that imprisonment exceeding thirty days would
normally cost the convicted person his job depriving his family of financial stability).
59. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 682.3 (West Supp. 1977).
60. Id. § 682a.
61. Id. § 688. There are, of course, a number of exemptions available to the debtor.
See, e.g., id. §§ 690-690.31.
62. Id. §§ 714-723 (West 1955 & Supp. 1977).
63. Id. § 717 (West Supp. 1977) (failure to appear pursuant to court order subjects that
party to arrest and punishment for contempt of court); id. § 1218 (West 1972) (statutory
punishment for contempt may include imprisonment).
64. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE-A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 276,
281, 284 (1974). Loss of employment, which is often the fate of a losing indigent civil
litigant whose wages are garnished, has been a major consideration in some courts for
requiring appointment of counsel even where only a short jail sentence is possible. "Any
incarceration of over thirty days, more or less, will usually result in loss of employment,
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in use cause such social disruption as to profoundly affect the defeated
litigant's personal liberty.6 5
With the gravity of the consequences thus approaching or exceeding
those in criminal cases, the court must inquire whether or not the litigant
enjoys a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 66 The answer may turn
upon whether the party is represented by counsel.6 7 The Supreme Court
has phrased it correctly: "Laymen cannot be expected to know how to
protect their rights when dealing with practiced and carefully counselled
adversaries .
"..."68This statement embodies a realization that the
knowledge of substantive and procedural law required to effectively
assert or protect one's rights in a civil or criminal proceeding cannot be
acquired in merely a day or even a year, especially when an opponent's
rights are being asserted or protected by someone who has made it his
life's work to learn and utilize the law.
But this second inquiry can go further. Independent of the significance
of the interest threatened with deprivation,- there may be a due process
duty to provide counsel when the hearing which is provided for a
decision on that interest is itself so complex that it cannot be "meaningful" to an unassisted layman. The maze of technical requirements for
complaints, answers, counterclaims and joinder of parties; the availability of interrogatories, depositions and discovery of documents; and the
timing and availability of pretrial, trial and post-trial motions, dispell any
notions that typical civil trials are procedurally simple. Empirical evidence confirms this thesis. One study in the District of Columbia found
that indigent civil plaintiffs representing themselves were much less
likely than represented parties to survive a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings, nine times less able to achieve a settlement, had no chance of
obtaining discovery and in no case reached a trial on the merits. 69
Another four-city study found that civil defendants represented by
counsel are almost six times more likely to succeed than those unable to
obtain a lawyer.7 °
Ordinarily, the due process clause is invoked to establish minimal
procedural standards of thoroughness and complexity for various
with a consequent substantial detriment, to the defendant and his family." Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.6 (1972).
65.
66.
67.
68.

Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 n.21 (1972).
See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).

69. Schmertz, The Indigent Civil Plaintiff in the District of Columbia: Facts and
Commentary, 27 FED. B.J. 235, 243 (1967).
70. B. RUBIN, CONSUMERS AND COURTS 109 (1971).
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categories of disputes. As suggested earlier, 7 for lesser interests a

simpler proceeding may suffice. But what about the situation where the
nature of the process already has been structured and is so complex that

an unrepresented layman is effectively helpless? Can that person be truly
said to have a "meaningful opportunity to be heard"? And does due

process really tolerate a deprivation of even rather "insignificant" rights
by a process in which the litigant is so powerless that the proceeding
borders on theft? It appears irrelevant that consistent with the Constitution the government could have provided a simple hearing to resolve such
disputes. Having chosen an intricate mechanism which can only be
operated by lawyers, due process seems to mandate free counsel for lowincome litigants.72
The United States Supreme Court has identified several factors indicat-

ing the indispensability of lawyers in criminal proceedings, all of which
seem to hold for civil litigation as well. In Gideon v. Wainwright,73 the
Court cited three factors. First, it emphasized the adversary nature of the
proceedings and recounted the many stages at which the knowledge and
skills of a lawyer are essential. 74 Certainly it is difficult to distinguish the
71. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
72. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 383 (1971), in which the Court stated
that once the government creates the exclusive means for obtaining a divorce, due process
requires that none be barred from utilizing the state imposed procedure because of an
inability to pay required fees.
73. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
74. "[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious
truth." Id. at 344. The Court continues, quoting from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932):
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.
372 U.S. at 345.
It does not strain the imagination whatsoever to substitute the events and processes of
civil proceedings in the above passage. And the conclusion would remain the same. As
plaintiffs, civil litigants would not be able to prepare a sound complaint. As defendants,
they would be incapable of determining whether the complaint was valid or of drafting an
adequate answer. Again they are unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. All in all, civil
litigants lack the skill and knowledge to prepare their cases adequately, though they have
perfect ones. They, too, face the near certainty of defeat solely because they do not know
how to establish the merits of their cause.
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typical civil court process on grounds it has a less adversary character or
is simpler. 75 Secondly, the Gideon Court pointed to the fact that adversaries of criminal defendants always employ lawyers. 76 Again, except in
the rare instance where both sides of a civil case are poor, indigent civil
litigants are almost always confronted by opponents who have the benefit
of counsel. Finally, the Court found further support for the view that
lawyers are "necessities, not luxuries" in the fact that affluent people in
the same circumstances as poor defendants ordinarily "hire the best
lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses." 77 And once
again, the test applies equally to civil proceedings. Seldom does someone
with means enter a civil courtroom without a lawyer at his side.
The opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin78 stressed that the Gideon
indicia applied to misdemeanors as well as felonies. 79 But it also added

another criterion: the actual effect of lawyers on the outcome of proceedings. The Court's decision relied on one study which "concluded that
'[m]isdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to
emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are defendants
who face similar charges without counsel. '80 As the reader may recall,
studies have reflected that the assistance
of counsel has at least that much
81
impact on the results in civil cases.
There is at least one sense in which a lawyer's assistance may be even
more crucial in civil than criminal proceedings. Certain aspects of the
criminal process are deliberately weighted to the advantage of the criminal defendant. There are no comparable doctrines in the civil process to
benefit the low-income civil litigant. The criminal accused enjoys a
presumption of innocence throughout; the case is carefully screened at
several stages by personnel whose sworn duty is to release the innocent
as well as prosecute the guilty; the prosecutor has an affirmative responsibility to search for and reveal evidence favorable to the accused; the
case against the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt;
and, in most jurisdictions, only the defendant can appeal, meaning that
judges have a strong motive to lean toward the defendant in rulings
during trial. None of these advantages apply in civil cases. The indigent
litigant's opponent has no responsibility to carefully screen his claims or
75. See note 72 supra & notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
76. "Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's
interest in an orderly society." 372 U.S. at 344.
77. Id.
78. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
79. Id. at 31-32.
80. Id. at 36 (quoting AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1970)).

81. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
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defenses nor to seek out and turn over evidence that might help the poor
person. This substantially increases the likelihood that civil cases will be
filed against indigent defendants which may be spurious, marginal or at
best insufficient on the merits. It likewise raises the probability that
indigent civil plaintiffs will be confronted with a barrage of unmeritorious defenses. Similarly, the rather easy standard of proof-a bare preponderance of the evidence-often can be readily satisfied by a lawyer's
superior presentation of a weak case against a layman's fumbling of a
82
strong one.
These very real differences in procedural advantages between criminal
and civil litigants suggest an important practical consequence. It is quite
probable that a much smaller percentage of innocent criminal defendants
were convicted before Gideon than the proportion of low-income civil
litigants who are presently deprived of their rights through lack of
counsel.
Only by rising (or descending) to new levels of hypocrisy may a court
hold that a civil litigant can enjoy a "meaningful opportunity to be
heard" while wallowing without the assistance of counsel amidst the
technicalities and intricacies of proceedings in the regular courts. Courts
presently find law students with four years of college and a full year of
law school not yet ready to enter the courtroom. Even those with a year
and one half or more of legal education are permitted to handle litigation
in California only if a lawyer is present to supervise their efforts (and take
over completely if a problem arises).83 Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger
claims that half of the full-fledged lawyers appearing in court are incompetent to handle a trial. In a recent statement, he emphasized the consequences for the litigant:
Just as hospitals almost universally do not allow first-, second-, or
third-year medical school graduates to perform surgery without
some demonstration of skill, why should we allow a first-, second-,
or third-year law school graduate to represent a client in court when
that client has significant rights and property at stake?84
82. This consideration-procedural advantages enjoyed by a criminal accused-closely
parallels the rationale adopted by the Swiss Supreme Court to support a more'lenient
policy for appointment of free counsel in civil than in criminal cases. In Switzerland's
inquisitorial criminal proceedings the need for attorneys-including defense attorneys-is
clearly minimized by the fact that the court arranges for the calling of witnesses, poses the
majority of the questions and generally ensures that the entire matter is laid before the
court. No such role is undertaken by the court in a civil case. O'Brien, Why Not
Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5-7 (1967).
83. State Bar of California, Rules for Practical Training of Law Students VI (May 15,
1976).
84. L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1978, pt. I, at 4, col. I (Chief Justice Warren Burger, Report
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Are we really to believe that a poor person with perhaps a third-grade
education (or even a college degree for that matter) is capable of a task
beyond the ability of most recently graduated lawyers and many who
have been practicing half a lifetime? And if we have even the slightest
doubt about entrusting a trial to some full-fledged lawyers when "significant rights and property" are at stake, how can we constitutionally throw
a poor layman into the arena without any legal counsel whatsoever? An
ancient (and frequently verified) axiom warns that a lawyer representing
himself has a fool for a client. How much more absurd is the position of a
layman forced to represent himself in the courts.
In summary, the due process clause appears to supply ample grounds
for a constitutional right to counsel throughout the country. The right can
be premised on the significance of the issues of property and liberty
presently litigated in the regular courts. These issues often carry more
consequences for litigants than the misdemeanor cases in which due
process already mandates free lawyers. Alternatively, the right to counsel
can be based on the complexity of proceedings in the regular civil courts.
The present process renders a "meaningful hearing" impossible without
the help of a lawyer, irrespective of the relative importance of the issues
at stake. Finally, the due process right obviously can be predicated on a
combination of the above theories. That is, in a given situation, both the
significance of the interests being litigated and the complexity of the
process established to hear the dispute may require the appointment of
counsel.
The Due Process Rationale for California's
Indigent Civil Defendants
California courts could employ any of the theories discussed in the
preceding section to create a due process right to counsel for civil
defendants. But the California Supreme Court has introduced some new
considerations and offered what is possibly a unique opportunity for poor
people to secure a constitutionally guaranteed right to legal assistance. 5
B.

on the State of the Judiciary, before the mid-winter meeting of the American Bar Association in New Orleans, La., Feb. 12, 1978).
85. There is only one small cloud over the prospects of indigent civil litigants in
California. There is a line of cases in some courts of appeal predating the Payne decision,
which have denied free counsel to parents in dependency and custody proceedings. In re
Joseph T., 25 Cal. App. 3d 120, 101 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1972) (petition for hearing denied July
12, 1972 by the California Supreme Court); In re George S., 18 Cal. App. 3d 788, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 203 (1971) (petition for hearing denied Oct. 21, 1971 by the California Supreme
Court, Peters and Tobriner, JJ., dissenting); In re Robinson, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 678 (1970) (petition for hearing denied Oct. 1, 1970 by the California Supreme Court,
Peters and Tobriner, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 964 (1971) (Black and
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In an important recent case, Payne v. Superior Court,8 6 a writ of

mandate was issued declaring that an indigent prisoner was denied his
right of access to the courts because he was not granted appointed
counsel in a case in which he was a civil defendant. 87 The Payne decision
appears a natural outgrowth of earlier California decisions recognizing
of indigents and the significance of legal assistance
the procedural rights
88
in civil litigation.
Douglas, JJ., dissenting at 954). These decisions stand in stark contrast to opinions in
similar cases in the courts of other states which have required that counsel be appointed in
such situations. E.g., Danforth v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me.
1973); In re B., 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. 1972); State v. Jamison, 444 P.2d 15 (Ore. 1968).
This line of court of appeal cases, of course, is not binding on the California Supreme
Court. Moreover, these decisions may have been weakened by subsequent decisions in
other California courts. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974), in which
the court emphasized the fact that the California Supreme Court had refused to hear these
types of claims and thus felt free to fashion its own rule that "due process requires the
state to appoint counsel whenever an indigent parent, unable to present his or her case
properly, faces a substantial possibility of the loss of custody or of prolonged separation
from a child." Id. at 945 (footnote omitted). See also In re JGL, 43 Cal. App. 3d 447, 117
Cal. Rptr. 799 (1974), where the court stated that the holding in In re Simeth, 40 Cal. App.
3d 982; 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974) (statutory changes require a reconsideration of In re
Robinson and authorize appointment of counsel in an appeal from an adverse custody
ruling), "obviously casts doubt on the continued validity of Robinson and Joseph T." 43
Cal. App. 3d at 449 n.l, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 801 n.l. Furthermore, this line of authority
appears inconsistent with Payne, since it rested on a rigid adherence to the criminal-civil
distinction, see, e.g., In re Joseph T., 25 Cal. App. 3d at 126, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (the
Robinson court "inferably rejected the due process argument. . . by relying upon the
civil-versus-criminal distinction"), which may have already been overruled implicitly in
Payne. See notes 100-09 infra and accompanying text.
If it is deemed absolutely essential to distinguish these cases from the usual civil trial,
that, too, is possible. Dependency proceedings are significantly less formal than most
other cases decided in California's superior or municipal courts. In fact, until forced to do
otherwise in 1971 by judicial decision, the state found it unnecessary to be represented by
lawyers in dependency cases, relying instead on lay probation officers to present its case.
R.v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 895, 97 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1971). The court's role is also
different in dependency hearings than in the typical civil case. The judge acts in a parens
patriae capacity, a posture difficult to sustain if the proceeding becomes too adversary in
nature. (On the other hand, parents able to employ counsel are allowed to enjoy such
assistance at these hearings.) More importantly, the procedures and issues ordinarily are
far less complex than the usual controversy over property (or other rights) in a more
typical civil case. Finally, the judge is more likely to use an inquisitorial approach in a
dependency hearing, thus rendering counsel less critical.
86. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
87. Id. at 926-27, 553 P.2d at 578-79, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 418-19.
88. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 652, 484 P.2d 70, 71,94 Cal. Rptr. 398,
399 (1971) (court has inherent power to waive its filing fees for indigent civil litigants);
Isrin v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 153, 165, 403 P.2d 728,736, 45 Cal. Rptr. 320, 328 (1965)
(right to proceed in forma pauperis is appropriate despite contingency fee arrangement
between ttorney and indigent litigant); Gardiana v. Small Claims Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d
412, 423-24, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675, 682 (1976) (court has power to appoint an interpreter free
of charge to an indigent civil litigant). Although one court of appeal has specifically denied
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Although not dealing specifically with indigents, the decision in Mendoza v. Small Claims Court8 9 was an early recognition of the right to
counsel in a civil case based upon due process protections. The court held

that a statute which allowed a tenant to be dispossessed of his premises
pursuant to an unlawful detainer action in small claims court was unconstitutional since it was in the court's discretion whether or not to stay the
dispossession pending a trial de novo in a higher court. 9° Since the small

claims court did not allow representation by attorneys, 9" a tenant might
be required to vacate the property before he had a chance to defend

said, to constitute a
himself with counsel. This was sufficient, the court
92
law.
of
process
due
without
property
taking of
Thus, California has taken a long step beyond the federal courts. Due

process already is construed to mandate an opportunity for representation
by counsel before a citizen can be deprived of property-as well as

liberty. Significantly, in Mendoza, this constitutional protection was
invoked on behalf of one of the most temporary and tenuous of property

rights, a leasehold.
California law has continued to evolve in this area. The California
Supreme Court itself has recognized that "the concept of a 'taking' has
93

been extended significantly" since the time of the Mendoza decision.

In recent years the Mendoza case has been applied to invalidate a statute

allowing prejudgment writs of attachment against bank checking accounts without a prior hearing. 94 Mendoza's right to counsel rationale
was employed in Brooks v. Small Claims Court,95 to hold unconstituthe right to appointed counsel for an indigent civil litigant, Hunt v. Hackett, 36 Cal. App.
3d 134, 111 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974), the trend toward
recognizing access rights of indigent civil litigants has not abated. The same justice who
wrote the Hackett decision subsequently ruled that an indigent civil defendant has the
right to interpreters at government expense. Jara v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 533,
542 (Ct. App. 1977), hearinggranted, May 26, 1977.
89. 49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958).
90. Id. at 673, 321 P.2d at 13.
91. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 117g (West 1954) (current version in § 117.4 (West Supp.
1977)). The constitutionality of a procedure excluding representation by counsel in small
claims court was approved in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d
379, 173 P.2d 38 (1946).
92. 49 Cal. 2d at 673, 321 P.2d at 12-13. The court in Mendoza rested its decision on the
language of the Prudential case: "There can be little doubt but that in both civil and
criminal cases the right to a hearing includes the right to appear by counsel, and that the
arbitrary refusal of such right constitutes a deprivation of due process." 49 Cal. 2d at 673,
321 P.2d at 12 (emphasis added).
93. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661, 666, 504 P.2d 1249, 1252, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 785, 788 (1973).
94. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 550-51, 488 P.2d 13, 22, 96 Cal. Rptr.
709, 718 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972).
95. 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973).
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tional a rule requiring the posting of an undertaking in order to appeal
from a small claims court's judgment, since even the temporary payment
of the judgment and costs constitutes a taking of property prior to an
opportunity for a hearing with counsel. The court's reasoning was
simple:
Because in the case before us the taking of property occurs prior to
the trial de novo and, hence, prior to defendant's first opportunity to
be represented by counsel, the procedure results in a denial of due
process. .

.

. [In Mendoza] we struck down the provision for a stay

of the unlawful detainer proceedings because the discretion vested
in the judge might be exercised so as to deprive a defendant of his
property before representation by counsel. Here, such deprivation is
an inevitable result, if defendant desires to appeal and obtain thereby a trial de novo with counsel. Therefore, we conclude that the
undertaking or deposit requirement constitutes a taking of property,
and
without a due process hearing with representation by counsel,
96
that such requirement is constitutionally impermissible.
With its decision in Brooks the California Supreme Court advanced
another long step toward a right to free counsel. In effect, it held that
civil defendants cannot be compelled to pay even a small sum in order to
enjoy the assistance of a lawyer.
It should be noted that the Prudential-Mendoza-Brooksline of cases
articulates a right to the assistance of counsel substantially equivalent in
definition to the right enunciated in the sixth amendment 97 for criminal
defendants. The language of this amendment does not on its face establish a right to free counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Rather, it
states that "the accused shall enjoy the right

. . .

to have the Assistance

of Counsel for his defense.'"98 This could have been construed merely to
allow defendants to employ lawyers to help them if they could afford to
do so. In fact, it was 149 years after the adoption of the Constitution
before the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst99 finally resolved this
ambiguity in favor of providing free counsel for those unable to afford
their own in federal criminal proceedings.
Now, through Prudential,Mendoza and Brooks, the California Supreme Court has held that in civil as well as criminal cases, citizens are
entitled to hearings where they enjoy the assistance of counsel. Thus, in
California, the civil right to counsel is in essentially the same posture as
if the sixth amendment language embraced civil proceedings. It seems
reasonable to apply the same construction to the Prudential-Mendoza96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 668, 504 P.2d at 1253-54, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90 (emphasis in original).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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Brooks right as the Supreme Court has to an equivalent formulation in
the Johnson, Gideon and Argersinger cases.

The California Supreme Court took a partial final step in 1976 by its
decision in Payne v. Superior Court," creating a comprehensive right to

free counsel for indigent civil defendants who happen to be imprisoned.
The Payne decision rests on due process provisions of both the federal
and California constitutions.' l0 According to United States Supreme
Court cases'012 and California cases' 013 due process requires processes
suitable to the particular circumstances. The Payne court discusses in
some detail the reasons why an indigent prisoner's situation mandates the
protection of the assistance of counsel. These three factors appear to
control: an indigent prisoner has less access to free legal services, cannot
seek out witnesses or investigate his case and often has limited education
or low intelligence." ° Therefore, even "allowing a right of personal
appearance is not an appropriate remedy for prisoners seeking to defend a
5
civil action." 10
Ordinary indigent civil litigants frequently find themselves in the same
situation with respect to these three factors. While it may be true that an
ordinary indigent litigant has the freedom to walk into a legal services
office, if there is one located within reasonable traveling distance, it is
also a fact, of growing disturbance to many, that the current system of
legal services in California can accommodate only about fifteen to twenty
percent of the needs of indigents. 1°
'
Even including contributions of
private attorneys, and other facilities for handling legal problems of the
poor, not every indigent person can obtain the needed legal advice and
assistance to defend or assert his rights. The remaining eighty percent is,
so to speak, in the same quandary over access to legal services as is the
indigent prisoner.
100. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
101. Id. at 914 n.3, 555 P.2d at 570 n.3, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 410 n.3 (the decision rests
equally on the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and art. I, § 7 of
the California Constitution).
102. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (due process violated when welfare recipient's benefits are terminated without a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing).
103. E.g., Sokol v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 418 P.2d 265, 53 Cal. Rptr.
673 (1966) (utility rule requiring removal of phone service for suspected illegal activity
denies due process by not providing for a hearing).
104. 17 Cal. 3d at 923, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
105. Id.
106. An estimated 700,000 poor people each year have legal problems and cannot obtain
the needed assistance. In Los Angeles County, for example, the Legal Aid Foundation
can provide the assistance of attorneys to only 15% of the county's indigents. L.A. Times,
Aug. 31, 1977, pt. II, at 3, col. 2.
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The second factor relied upon by the Payne court was the inability of
indigent prisoners to investigate their own cases by seeking out witnesses
and gathering facts. Again, while it may be that the ordinary indigent
litigant has the freedom to walk about and seek out witnesses, he may
have neither the finances available to carry out such procedures, the time
in which to do it, nor the knowledge of how to go about doing it. He may
be "imprisoned" at his job, or in his home, with respect to the ability to
investigate his case. Moreover, without knowledge of the law, he will
not know which are the "operative facts," which witnesses are relevant
or what questions to ask them, or what documents are relevant or how to
obtain admissible copies of them." °7
Finally, the Payne court referred to the limited education and low
intelligence level of prisoners. Unfortunately, such is also the plight of
ordinary non-prisoner indigents in our society. 108 An indigent with limited education will and does find it more difficult than the average
educated person to pursue his case on his own. The original cause for the
litigation is -often due to the inability of the indigent to understand the
complexities of a business transaction, such as the common consumer
contract. How can he then unravel these complexities when challenged
upon them in the courtroom?
With these three factors common to the lives of ordinary indigent
litigants, the Payne argument implies that even a right of personal
appearance is not an adequate remedy. This broader understanding of the
Payne rationale is available to guide other courts on the path toward
granting to all indigents the financial assistance necessary for access to
court and the concomitant right to a meaningful hearing. 0 9
C. The Due Process Rationale for California's
Indigent Civil Plaintiffs
The plight of the indigent civil plaintiff deserves special mention,
since both courts and commentators have distinguished the rights of
plaintiffs from those of defendants. "10 It is argued that a civil defendant
107. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
108. See L. THUROW, POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 68 (1969). It has been estimated
that improvements in education alone could reduce the incidence of poverty from a 1970
level of 18.8% to a 1980 level of 16.8%. Id. at 38.
109. Significantly, one court of appeal embraced the Payne rationale in holding that the
government must provide and pay for an interpreter for a non-English speaking civil
defendant regardless of whether or not he is represented by counsel as the state has no
interest so compelling as to overcome the indigent's due process right to a meaningful
hearing. Jara v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 533, 540-42 (Ct. App. 1977), hearing
granted, May 26, 1977.
110. E.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (no waiver of filing fee for indigent
wishing to appeal adverse welfare ruling); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973)
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may be afforded certain protections under due process which are denied
to a plaintiff because the defendant has been "thrust" into the legal
system, and has no choice but to argue out his rights in a court of law. II
A plaintiff, on the other hand, supposedly has the option of resorting or
not resorting to the courts to obtain relief.
Admittedly the arguments supporting a civil plaintiff's right to free
counsel are more obvious under the common law" 12 and equal protection" '3 rationales than due process. On the face of it, a civil plaintiff, in
contrast to a defendant, is not threatened with a deprivation of his
property or liberty through governmental process, due or undue. In fact,
it is he who desires to invoke that process to obtain property from
someone else or to compel that person to do something (in effect, to
restrict the other's liberty). In contrast, the plain language of "equal
protection of the laws" and its concomitant "like access to the courts" 4
implies no such distinction between plaintiffs and defendants. And the
common law rationale, if anything, provides more straightforward support for a right to counsel for civil plaintiffs than for civil defendants."'
Nonetheless, ample justification also can be found in the due process
rationale. In a very real sense, a person with a meritorious claim to
property illegally possessed by another is being deprived of that property
without due process of law if he is denied the assistance of counsel
necessary to attain an adjudication of his right to gain possession of what
is, in fact, his property. True, the original deprivation may have occurred
without any intervention by the state. The potential plaintiff's claim to
the property held by another may arise because it was stolen from him,
taken through fraud, or because it is owed due to a breach of contract, an
automobile accident or whatever. But no matter what the circumstances
of the initial deprivation, there is a continuing deprivation of that property directly attributable to the denial of due process.
The Stipreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut'16 explicitly recognized
that denying some civil plaintiffs access to the courts violates the due
(filing fees for persons seeking to file for bankruptcy not waived); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S.' 371 (1971) (filing fees waived for indigent suing for divorce); The Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, supra note 42, at 1329-39; The Indigent's Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, supra note 42, at 555-56.
11l. But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971) (plaintiffs' resort to

judicial process to obtain divorce was only avenue open and "is no more voluntary in a
realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interest in court").
112. See notes 6-41 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 132-93 infra and accompanying text.
114. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
115. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.

116. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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process clause. But that case and two of its successors ' 7 appear to limit
the due process rationale to categories of civil plaintiffs who under no
circumstances could obtain what they seek except through the courts. 118
Boddie itself involved plaintiffs desiring to obtain divorces and by its
language apparently confined relief to those situations, like divorce,
where the imprimatur of the court is absolutely essential. A husband and
wife cannot agree independent of court action to alter their legal status.
Only the court can accomplish that purpose. Hence a denial of access to
the courts for someone seeking a divorce constitutes a violation of the
119
due process clause.
Returning briefly to our example of someone whose property has been
stolen, taken by fraud, or the like, the Boddie language presumably
would not mandate even the waiver of filing fees for the indigent
plaintiff. After all, judicial process is not inherently essential to the
transfer of the property from the prospective defendant to the prospective
plaintiff. Unlike divorce, the court is not required to formally review any
voluntary (or involuntary) shift of the property from one "possessor" to
another.
But what are the other avenues supposedly available to someone with a
legal claim to property currently possessed by another? It is possible to
identify at least four. First, as the result of two-party negotiations, the
prospective plaintiff could persuade the prospective defendant to transfer
the property voluntarily. Second, the issue could be resolved through
submission to a voluntary non-judicial forum, ordinarily mediation or
arbitration. 120 Third, the prospective plaintiff could obtain his property
117. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973).
118. The welfare recipients in Ortwein had been granted an evidentiary hearing by an

administrative agency prior to termination of benefits, 410 U.S. at 659, and the petitioner
in Kras had other alternatives to bankruptcy such as negotiation with his creditors. 409
U.S. at 445.
119. 401 U.S. at 374.
120. "Arbitration" is a term which covers a wide range of dispute resolution mechanisms, both voluntary and involuntary, formal and informal, binding and non-binding.
Arbitrators are generally private citizens who sit in panels of three or more. The proceedings do not rely greatly on precedent or on the rules of evidence. Once the arbitrators have
heard both sides of the dispute and asked questions, they decide the case. See generally E.
JOHNSON, JR., V. KANTOR, & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A STUDY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES 39-55 (1977); Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer:

Compulsory Arbitrationof Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1961).
Mediation, on the other hand, is a persuasive remedy. The mediator plays a neutral role,
listening and facilitating conversation between disputants. Rather than suggest his own
solution, the mediator draws out each party's position to help them arrive at a compromise, by sensitively exposing the underlying problems and stimulating the parties to
express their preferences and limits of acceptable solution. See generally Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971).
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through legal self-help (ordinarily pursuant to some contractual arrangement such as a repossession clause). And finally, the prospective plaintiff
could engage in illegal self-help--theft, trickery, or the like.
But how realistic are these alternatives to the judicial process, especially for the low-income person? And most especially for one who, by
definition, lacks the assistance of legal counsel? Assuming the prospective defendant is a business enterprise or other institution or even a more
affluent individual, it is unlikely that two-party settlement will be possible. Why should such a "defendant" voluntarily enter into negotiations
about giving away property he now possesses with someone who lacks
the resources to compel a transfer through court proceedings? Even when
they occur, such negotiations seem unlikely to be meaningful. The
disparity in bargaining power ordinarily is too great and the difference in
bargaining skill-often between a low-income, poorly educated layman
and a lawyer or trained, experienced manager-is too significant to offer
the prospective plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to obtain through
voluntary negotiations what the court would award if he had the means to
litigate.
The same considerations likewise render voluntary third party forums
very unpromising alternatives for the low-income plaintiff. Why should
an affluent defendant agree to submit the issue to binding arbitration?
Since the plaintiff is unable to afford litigation, the defendant's continued
possession of the property is assured if he refused to arbitrate. That
possession can only be jeopardized through arbitration. With nothing to
gain and everything to lose, it seems logical that prospective defendants
will seldom submit to arbitration when confronted by a low-income, and
under Boddie, helpless prospective plaintiff.
Mediation presents only a slightly different situation. By definition,
these forums do not impose solutions on the parties.' 2' The ultimate
resolution must be acceptable to both sides. Furthermore, the mediation
alternative is especially sensitive to disparities in bargaining power.
Hence one must ask not only whether a prospective defendant would
bother to participate in a mediation session but whether he would agree to
terms that shifted possession of property from him to the low-income
disputant. If confronted with a disputant to whom the courts are effectively closed, the prospects appear dim that many would take the time to
mediate. It seems even less probable that they would accede to a settle121. "[T]he central quality of mediation [is] . . . its capacity to reorient the parties
toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new
and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes
and dispositions toward one another." Fuller, supra note 120, at 325.
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ment that granted the low-income person anything approaching what the
law provides and the court would award.
It also should not be assumed that arbitration and mediation machinery
is readily available. Although alternatives for redressing non-judicial
grievances may be in better supply than they were in the past, 2 2 they are
far from comprehensive. New mechanisms are being implemented for
arbitration of small claims, consumer mediations and the like; 123 yet not
all civil cases will fit neatly into these categories. Moreover, there is no
guarantee that non-judicial forums will be effectively open to the indigent
essential as they would be if
would-be plaintiff. In many, lawyers are as
24
the dispute were to be resolved in court. 1
Legal self-help measures also have severe limitations for the lowincome person. First, in many situations they simply do not exist even in
theory. A person who claims he was defrauded of $10,000 cannot
legitimately march in and take $10,000 from the alleged defrauder's
home or business by force or stealth. Second, most of the more effective
self-help remedies-repossession and the like-exist only if they have
been incorporated in preexisting agreements between the prospective
plaintiff and the prospective defendant. Thus, they must have been
bargained for. Low-income individuals, once again, lack the power, the
knowledge and the lawyers to negotiate for these legal self-help provisions. And finally, even where noncontractual self-help remedies are
available, one ordinarily needs the advice of a lawyer to know of their
existence and, equally important, how to exercise these rights without
overstepping the bounds of legality. As a consequence of these factors,
self-help tends to be an option only for those who can afford to litigate
but not for those who cannot. Helplessness in the courts means helplessness outside as well.
The remaining alternative-illegal self-help-most certainly is not
what the Boddie Court meant to imply was a satisfactory substitute for
litigation. In fact, the opinion emphasized that one of the principal goals
of the legal system and a primary function of due process is the avoidance
of this sort of conduct.." Yet the Court's holding left many indigent civil
plaintiffs with no legal options. Ironically, the existence of a guaranteed
122. See generally E. JOHNSON, JR., V. KANTOR, & E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 120.

123. Id. at 57-76. For a general discussion of alternative models and proposals for
alleviating some of the problems associated with modern litigation see volume 1I, number
3 of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
124. For example, one 1974 study of arbitration in the New York Small Claims Courts
found that parties represented by counsel fared much better in arbitration, adjudication
and settlement. Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing:Litigation in a Small Claims
Court, 10 LAW & Soc'y REV. 334, 349, 370 (1976).
125. 401 U.S. at 374-75.
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right of effective access to the courts appears to be an essential prerequisite to the other alternative ways of resolving most civil claims. Without
the leverage such a right confers, it is difficult to bring affluent defendants to the bargaining table, to the arbitrator, to the mediator, or to create
and exercise meaningful self-help remedies.
Thus if appellate judges deny access to the courts they leave open only
one practical alternative for most low-income civil plaintiffs-to pursue
their perceived property rights through force, theft, stealth or fraud. And
if this perverted form of self-help is unavailable against the individual or
institution believed to be holding the poor person's property, then he may
be tempted to recover a similar sum from a closer, easier target. In this
way the denial of due process to civil plaintiffs actually could contribute
to the crime rate.
Of course, individual morality or fear of criminal prosecution can be
counted on to dissuade most low-income citizens from following this
course. But then the morality of society's position is in doubt. To
effectively foreclose all options (but the criminal alternative) for pursuing
legitimate property rights and then to punish those who exercise that
option can scarcely build loyalty to society and the legal system among
low-income citizens. Thus, the denial of due process to civil plaintiffs
could even encourage social disintegration.
Fortunately, the California courts are not limited by Boddie and its
successors. A more liberal interpretation of due process is entirely possible. 12 6 And if the California courts desire to expand beyond Boddie,
there are ample grounds. Possibly the most important were explored
above. But there is another obvious reason for treating civil plaintiffs and
civil defendants alike. Often it is quite an arbitrary matter who is the
plaintiff and who is the defendant.' 27 Granting access to defendants but
not to plaintiffs could serve only to encourage a "waiting game," each
party preferring to be the defendant,' 28 and perhaps in the long run failing
to assert his rights or being barred by law.
As a matter of fact, in California, the court fees involved in Boddie
(and many other litigation expenses) already are waived for all indigent
civil plaintiffs, not merely those seeking divorces or like relief available
"exclusively" in the courts. 129 Though based on the common law
126. See, e.g., Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1976); Douglas, The Right to Counsel, A Foreward, 45 MINN. L. Rnv. 693, 694 (1961)
(counsel is needed wherever substantive or procedural rights may not be asserted because
of ignorance or inexperience).
127. The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 42, at 555.
128. Id.
129. Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
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rationale1 30 rather than due process, this interpretation is some evidence
of a more generous attitude on the part of California judges toward
plaintiffs in general. Moreover, under California precedents the due
process right to a hearing at which counsel is present already appears to
extend to civil plaintiffs with property claims.' 3' Accordingly, the
California courts seem well on their way toward a construction of due
process which treats indigent civil plaintiffs and defendants alike.
IV.

THE NEGATIVE MANDATE: THE EQUAL PROTECTION RATIONALE
FOR A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION FOR
INDIGENT CIVIL LITIGANTS

The equal protection clause has generated a multiple set of alternative
tests for appraising the constitutionality of governmental policies. The
negative mandate of the clause prohibits a state from invidiously discriminating between persons or groups, and is tested by at least two, and
(currently) possibly three standards of review. If a discrimination touches
upon a fundamental right' 32 or affects what has become known as a
suspect class, 3 3 the court must review the state's action with strict
scrutiny. 134 Traditionally, all other actions challenged on equal protection
grounds are reviewed under the rational basis test and upheld if some
rational connection can be found between a state's purpose and its
action.' 35 More recently the courts have begun to utilize a middle standard in some areas, requiring that the action be substantially related to an
important state purpose. 136 The denial to an indigent civil litigant of the
130. See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.
131. Although the issue of whether this right exists for plaintiffs has not been addressed
squarely by California courts, it can be inferred from the opinion in Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 382, 173 P.2d 38, 39-40 (1946), in which claimants
in small claims court were presumed to have waived their right to the assistance of counsel
by electing to file in a forum which barred representation by lawyers. As a matter of logic,
it is difficult to waive a right one does not possess.
132. See Bice, supra note 34, at 695-98 for a recent discussion of fundamental rights
under the equal protection clause.
133. See id. at 693-95 for a brief history of the Court's treatment of suspect classifications.
134. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1968) (one year residency requirement
for receipt of welfare benefits impedes a fundamental right to travel so that its constitutionality will be judged by a stricter standard of whether it is mandated by a compelling
state interest); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (state must sustain a very heavy
burden to justify a law containing racial classifications such as the one at bar prohibiting
interracial marriage); Bice, supra note 34, at 694, 696.
135. See Bice, supra note 34, at 698-702.
136. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190'(1976) (while not holding that sex is a suspect
classification, the Court held that a law prohibiting sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 and
females under 18 violates the equal protection clause).
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right to appointed counsel must be evaluated in light of all three of these
alternative tests.

At the outset it should be stated that this issue can be decided under the
California Constitution 137 rather than under the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution. 3 8 As the California Supreme Court has
recently stated: "[S]tate equal protection provisions, while 'substantially
the equivalent of' the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution, are possessed of an independent vitality
which, in a given case, may demand an analysis different from that
which would obtain if only the federal standard were applicable." 139 The
California Supreme Court has indicated repeatedly that especially in the
area of fundamental constitutional civil liberties, it refers first to California law, respectfully considering United States Supreme Court decisions,
but following them only when they provide no less protection than
California law. 140
A. Strict Scrutiny Standard
The United States and California Supreme Courts have frequently
invalidated state discriminations based on wealth which affected the

rights of criminal defendants.141 The state actions were found to discriminate invidiously. The courts have not, however, limited their prohibitions

of invidious discrimination against the poor to criminal cases. They have
considered equal protection challenges on behalf of noncriminal indigents in several different contexts, including voting rights 142 and educational opportunity. 143 And individual justices have suggested explicitly
that wealth discriminations are unconstitutional in civil as well as criminal proceedings."
137. The California Constitution provides that "[a] person may not be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
138. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
139. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366
(1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2951 (1977).
140. Id. at 764-65, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366 and cases and articles cited
therein.
141. E.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (indigent criminal defendant cannot
be kept beyond maximum statutory term to work off fine he cannot pay); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent entitled to free counsel on appeal of right from
criminal conviction); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970)
(indigent criminal defendant cannot be imprisoned because he is unable to pay fine).
142. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax invalidated).
143. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2951 (1977) (public school system financing based on taxes on the
property valuation within school districts invalidated).
144. Meltzer v. C. Buck Le Craw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 958-59 (1971) (Black, J.,
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It is not altogether clear by what standard of review the courts will
decide wealth discrimination cases in the future. In the past,4 both the
strict scrutiny test and the rational basis test have prevailed.1 1
The strict scrutinyr test will apply in either of two circumstances. If
wealth is found to be a suspect class like race and possibly sex, any state
action which has the effect of discriminating against poor people (including those affecting the rights of civil litigants) must be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Or, assuming wealth is not a suspect class, meaningful access
to the courts may be deemed a fundamental interest, in which case any
discriminations (including those based on wealth) must further a compelling state interest.
1. Wealth as a Suspect Classification
The Supreme Court opinion in Griffin v. Illinois146 is probably the
genesis for the argument that wealth is a suspect class. In that case, it was
admitted that the United States Constitution did not mandate a system of
post-conviction remedies for prisoners. However, once creating that
right, Illinois could not administer it in a manner that unduly discriminated against the poor.147 The Griffin analysis was expanded in
Douglas v. California'48 to require appointment of counsel for appellants
in criminal cases. The Court's reliance on Griffin suggested that neither
the sixth amendment nor the due process analysis of the fourteenth
amendment requires that defendants be allowed counsel on appeal. But
having provided for appeals and allowing those with money to enjoy the
assistance of a lawyer, the State of California must appoint attorneys for
those too poor to employ their own.' 49 Similarly, even though there may
be no federal constitutional requirement that any litigant be allowed the
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 387-89 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1039 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Some commentators think that the Court will find it
problematical to hold wealth as a suspect classification for external sociological reasons,
such as the difficulty in proving the impact of laws on society and the complex economic
decisions involved in determining what level of service to guarantee to the poor and what
to charge them for it. Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 289, 352-53.
145. Compare Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state's denial of counsel to
indigent litigant on appeal of right was invidious discrimination prohibited by the fourteenth amendment) with San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I
(1973) (state system of financing public schools had a rational basis so as not to violate the
equal protection clause).
146. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (denial of free transcript to indigent criminal defendant for
appeal violates equal protection).
147. Id. at 18.
148. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
149. Id. at 355.
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assistance of counsel in state civil cases, once that right is created by
statute, court rule, or a state constitution, it can be argued that it must be

administered in a manner that does not invidiously discriminate against
impoverished parties.

The Supreme Court has not yet held that any and all discriminations
based on wealth are invalid unless necessary to promote a compelling
state interest. In fact, there is some evidence that the Court will not test

wealth discrimination with strict scrutiny unless a fundamental interest is
50
involved. 1

The State of California, however, differs considerably. The California
Supreme Court has held that wealth is a suspect classification in criminal
proceedings 1 5 1 and suggested in the Serrano decisions it might be in civil
contexts as well.1 52 The most relevant language appears in Serrano i:
Thus, the fact that a majority of the United States Supreme Court
have now chosen to contract the area of active and critical analysis
under the strict scrutiny test for federal constitutional purposes can
have no effect upon the existing construction and application afforded our own constitutional provisions. Nor can the additional fact-if
it be a fact-that certain of the high court's former decisions...
may not be expected to thrive in the shadow of Rodriguez cause us
to withdraw from the principles we there announced on state as well
as federal grounds.
For these reasons then, we now adhere to our determinations,
made in Serrano I, that for the reasons there stated and for purposes
of assessing our state public school financing system in light of our
state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws . . . discriminationin educationalopportunity on the basis of
153
district wealth involves a suspect classification ....
150. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-33 &
n.71 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 484-85 (1970). See generally Clune, supra note 144, at 327-34, 352-53.
151. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 112,473 P.2d 999, 1006, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255,262 (1970).
152. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 765-68, 557 P.2d 929, 951-52, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345,
367-68 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2951 (1977); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597-98,
487 P.2d 1241, 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 610 (1971).
153. 18 Cal. 3d at 765-66, 557 P.2d at 950-51, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67 (emphasis added
and footnote omitted). In a footnote, however, the California Supreme Court in effect
reserved its decision whether wealth would be a suspect classification in all circumstances
no matter how negligible the right involved:
In view of this conclusion [that education is a fundamental interest] we need not
address the problem. . . whether in applying our state equal-protection provision we
should insist upon strict scrutiny reyiew of all governmental classifications based on
wealth, thus elevating such classifications to a level of "suspectedness" equivalent to
those based on race. .

.

. [W]e hold

.

. .

that this combination of factors warrants

strict judicial scrutiny under our state equal protection provisions.
Id. at 766 n.45, 557 P.2d at 951 n.45, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367 n.45.
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Applying this test to civil litigation, it can be observed that just as the
state has established an educational system, it has installed a judicial
system. Moreover, both are financed by taxes and both can confer
benefits on the state's citizens. But the judicial system also can impbse
losses (on losing litigants). Yet the distribution of government funded
dispute resolution services is more adversely affected by wealth discrimination than the allocation of educational services condemned in the
Serrano decisions. Less affluent school districts may end up with lesser
educational resources than wealthy ones, but residents of those areas will
at least be educated.1 54 In contrast a low-income individual may be
denied any judicial services at all if he cannot afford to employ the
lawyer essential to effectively activate the legal system. Worse than that,
those judicial services can be used against him to deprive him of his
theoretical legal rights unless he has the wherewithal to hire counsel.
Due to the uniquely competitive nature of litigation the impact of
wealth discrimination becomes especially invidious in the context of civil
litigation between affluent and low-income litigants. The affluent litigant
enjoys the advantage of assistance of counsel while the poor person,
because of poverty, not only is forced to flounder by himself amidst the
complexities of civil litigation, but has to compete with his opponent's
skilled counsel. It is one thing when the affluent party enjoys his advanTwo observations are in order. Despite this qualification, the California Supreme Court
has not, by this language, rejected the possibility it will hold that wealth is a suspect
classification when that is necessary. It remains more receptive to that argument than the
present United States Supreme Court. Second, even if not found to be a "fundamental
interest," the right to a lawyer in civil proceedings is not a negligible matter and might well
supply the requisite "combination of factors," when intertwined with the wealth classification, to trigger the strict scrutiny test.
154. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
An educational financing system might be hypothesized, however, in which the
analogy to wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If elementary
and secondary education were made available by the State only to those able to pay a
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor"
people-definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum-who would be
absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would present a far more
compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us today.
Id. at 25 n.60.
In Rodriguez, the school revenue was based on wealth because it largely depended upon
the local real property taxes. The tax base, or assessed valuation of the property, greatly
affected the amount of revenue which a school district could raise. The tax rate could
vary among districts if the residents were willing to devote more money to education. Id.
at 46. Nevertheless, although persons living in a poorer district raised less money for the
schooling of their children, they did raise some money for this purpose. In addition, the
state contributed some support to all districts, rich and poor. The plight of the indigent
litigant who receives no money for representation of counsel is therefore more compelling
in a constitutional sense.
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tage in a completely separate lawsuit, a proceeding that he can win
without endangering the poor man's opportunity for success. This was
the situation in Douglas and Griffin where the court is comparing one
criminal defendant with another (i.e., those who can and those who
cannot afford to pay for the needed services). But the discrimination
appears doubly invidious when the affluent and non-affluent are in direct
competition in the same proceeding. The wealthy party may win that
particular case not because he is right but because he has money, and the
indigent litigant may lose that same case not because he is wrong but
because he is poor.
In a 1971 case, a New York appellate court, while ordering appointment of free counsel for indigent tenants, expressly recognized this
consideration. Holding that equal protection of the laws created a right to
counsel for civil litigants, the court stated: "Absent counsel, there is
evident possibility of unfairness in the disparate expertise of landlord's
attorney and that of the tenant appearing in person. ' 155 If Griffin,
Douglas and their progeny disapprove of discrimination based on wealth
where the persons affected by the disparity are involved in independent
legal proceedings, a fortiori, the concerns which gave birth to those
decisions must be given weight where the evils of discrimination are
more direct and immediate.
2. The Fundamental Interest in Civil Litigation
Whether indigency will ever be considered a suspect classification is
not determinative for California's poor. The strict standard of review is
also triggered when fundamental rights are involved. 156 For example,
even a small poll tax of $1.50 was invalidated by the Supreme Court as
an infringement upon an indigent's right to vote. 157 When a fundamental
right is involved, the Court will strictly scrutinize the state law or action
whether or not wealth is construed to be a suspect classification. 158
A fundamental interest can be found in both the substantive and
procedural aspects of civil litigation. Thus far, most courts have limited
their examinations to the nature of the substantive right implicated in the
dispute. Only if that right is categorized as fundamental is it deemed to
merit the protection of free counsel for low-income litigants. 159
155. Hotel Martha Washington Mgt. Co. v. Swinick, 332 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (Sup. Ct.
App. Term 1971).
156. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
157. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
158. See id. at 670.
159. See In re B., 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. 1972). "A parent's concern for the liberty of
the child, as well as for his care and control, involves too fundamental an interest and right
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Application of this test of "fundamentalness" brings us to an inquiry
analogous to one of the due process theories. 16 0 Are the consequences of

a given piece of civil litigation as significant as those attending categories
of disputes already found to involve fundamental interests? Under this
standard, all civil cases threatening possible confinement, most adjudications of other forms of liberty, and many in which property rights are at
61
stake could logically be construed as involving fundamental interests.1
The justification for so interpreting substantial property rights (substantial to the individual litigant, that is) is similar once again to the due

process rationale. The economic, social and psychological disruptions
accompanying a taking (or denial) of a significant amount of property can
be as devastating as a criminal conviction. 162 One thus has a fundamental
interest in preserving or asserting at least some property
rights which is as
163
great as the interest in preserving physical freedom.
Under California law, however, the more promising avenue of search
for a fundamental interest has little to do with the nature of the substantive right in dispute. The procedural right to have the assistance of
counsel in civil proceedings may itself constitute a fundamental interest.
If so, the court must apply the strict scrutiny test to determine whether
one class of litigants suffers discrimination in its enjoyment of that right.
The notion that equal access to the courts qualifies as a fundamental
interest can be traced to an 1885 decision of the United States Supreme
Court, Barbier v. Connolly. 164
The Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that no State "shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws," undoubtedly intended not only that there
should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary
. . .to be relinquished. . . without the opportunity for a hearing, with assigned counsel
if the parent lacks the means to retain a lawyer." Id. at 136 (emphasis added). See also
Danforth v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973) (since right of
parents to custody of child has a constitutional dimension due process requires state paid
counsel at custody hearing); In re Smiley, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (N.Y. 1975) (appointed
counsel denied in divorce case since it did not involve a "risk of loss of liberty or grevious
forfeiture"); State v. Jamison, 444 P.2d 15 (Ore. 1968) (fundamental nature of parental
right to custody of child requires that counsel be provided at state's expense before such
right be terminated). Cf. Hunt v. Hackett, 36 Cal. App. 3d 134, 137, 111 Cal. Rptr. 456, 458
(1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974), in which the court's refusal to extend the right to
counsel in criminal settings to a civil indigent suggests that only rights at jeopardy in a
criminal setting are fundamental.
160. See notes 50-84 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 91-95 supra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
164. 113 U.S. 27 (1885) (municipal ordinance prohibiting laundry owners and employees
from washing and ironing at night not violative of equal protection).
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spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should
be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their
personal and civil rights;.
that they should have like access to the
courts of the country for the protectionof theirpersons andproperty,
the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of
contracts .... 165
The Payne decision lends further support to this characterization in
California as the following quotation demonstrates:
The denial of access also constitutes a prima facie equal protection violation. Indigent prisoners are denied access to the courts to
defend a civil suit while free persons and prisoners possessing the
means to hire counsel retain an access right. As has been established, to be heard in court to defend one's property is a right of
fundamental constitutional dimension; in order to justify granting
the right to one group while denying it to another, the state must
show a compelling state interest. 166
For reasons explored earlier under our discussion of the due process
rationale,167 there is ample evidence that to function competently (and
successfully) within the court system a party needs the assistance and
guidance of an attorney. Consequently, in the present day at least,
citizens' access to the courts "for the protection of persons and property" depends upon whether they have attorneys. And "like access"
would seem to require appointment of free counsel for those unable to
afford their own.
The fundamental interest test has special application in California. The
California Supreme Court has expressly held that the right to be represented by counsel in civil cases is a constitutional right. 16 8 The authority
for this proposition is found chiefly in the series of small claims court
appeals discussed under the due process rationale which held that
"[t]here can be little doubt but that in both civil and criminal cases the
right to a hearing includes the right to appear by counsel . . "169
The United States Supreme Court, in San Antonio Independent School
Districtv. Rodriguez, 170 suggested a criterion for appraising fundamental
165. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
166. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 919, 553 P.2d 565, 573, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405,
413 (1976) (footnote and citation omitted).
167. See notes 66-84 supra and accompanying text.
168. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661, 667-68, 504 P.2d 1249, 1253-54, 105
Cal. Rptr. 785, 789-90 (1973); Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 673, 321
P.2d 9, 12 (1958).
169. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 382, 173 P.2d 38,
39 (1946). See notes 89-96 supra and accompanying text.
170. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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interests which apparently would automatically place the right of counsel
for California's civil litigants in that category: "[T]he key to discovering
whether [a right] is 'fundamental' .

. .

lies in assessing whether [the

right is] explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."' 7' Since
the California Supreme Court has expressly held that the right to enjoy
the assistance of counsel in civil cases is a constitutional right, under
Rodriguez it would qualify by definition as a fundamental interest.
This conclusion does not follow automatically in California, however.
In Serrano 1, the court, mindful of the length and flexibility of the state
72
constitution, expressly refused to adopt the Rodriguez reasoning.'
Accordingly, not every right included in the California Constitution rises
to the level of a fundamental interest thereby triggering the close scrutiny
test.
The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, did indicate that the
constitutional nature of a right was a strong indication that it would
qualify as a fundamental interest. 173 In effect, the constitutional posture
of the right to counsel for civil litigants in California probably means that
it will be subjected to close scrutiny to determine whether in fact it is a
fundamental interest which, in turn, would warrant close scrutiny of any
discriminations between classes in the exercise of that right.
Beyond its constitutional stature, there are several grounds in California for deeming the right to assistance of counsel in civil cases a
fundamental interest. First, it is an essential ingredient to what is one of
the most basic functions of government. As the Supreme Court stated so
eloquently in Boddie:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of
rules

. . .

enabling [its members] to

. .

. settle their differences in

171. Id. at 33-34.
172. [O]ur application of the strict scrutiny test in this case should in no way be
interpreted to imply an acceptance of the theory . . . by which the Rodriguez
approach to assessing "fundamentalness" in affected rights is applied by analogy in
the state sphere. . . . Suffice it to say that we are constrained no more by inclination
than by authority to gauge the importance of rights and interests affected by legislative classifications wholly through determining the extent to which they are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed". . . by the terms of our compendious, comprehensive,
and distinctly mutable state Constitution.
18 Cal. 3d at 767, 551 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (footnote omitted). The court noted
the fact that the California Constitution was amended 300 times, and expanded nearly
fivefold to 75,000 words in less than a century, between 1879 and 1964. Id. at 767 n.47, 557
P.2d at 952 n.47, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368 n.47.
173. "We do not suggest, of course, that the treatment afforded particular rights and
interests by the provisions of our state Constitution is not to be accorded significant
consideration in determinations of this kind. We do suggest that this factor is not to be
given conclusive weight." Id. at768 n.48,557 P.2d at 952 n.48, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368 n.48.
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an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a "legal system,"
social organization and cohesion are virtually impossible. . .. [I]t
is this . . that allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what
political theorists call the "state of nature."
* * ' Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his
rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the
State's monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution
could hardly be said to be acceptable under our scheme of things.
Only by providing that the social enforcement mechanism must
function strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an
ordered society that is also just. 74

California, having already recognized that a lawyer's assistance is essential to due process in civil cases, has in essence made it a prerequisite of
the state's monopoly over binding conflict resolution and an essential
ingredient of an ordered society.
Second, it is an integral part of a right more "fundamental" than
rights already held to so qualify by the California Supreme Court. As
significant as the Serrano decisions found education to be, 175 it is not as

basic to "an ordered society" as like access to peaceful means for
resolving disputes. Long before government assumed responsibility for

educating, children-at a time when this task was performed, if at all, by
parents-the village elders or other rulers were deciding civil disputes
between their citizens or subjects.
Third, this right is essential to render meaningful those other rights
which already have been deemed fundamental interests. One of the

primary grounds for finding education a fundamental interest in Serrano
I was its intimate connection with the fundamental interest in a citizenry
able to participate in its own governance. 176 The right to the assistance of
a lawyer is even more intimately related to effective citizenship. The
174. Boddie v. Connecticut, 40! U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971).
175. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 761, 557 P.2d 929, 948, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 364
(1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2951 (1977); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 604-610, 487
P.2d 1241, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-19 (1971).
176. "[T]he indispensable role which education plays. . . has two significant aspects:
first, education is a major determinant of an individual's chances for economic and social
success . . . [and] second, education is a unique influence on a child's development as a
citizen and his participation in political and community life." 5 Cal. 3d at 605, 487 P.2d at
1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16. "The analogy between education and voting is . . .
direct: both are crucial to participation in, and the functioning of, a democracy. Voting has
been regarded as a fundamental right because it is 'preservative of other basic civil and
political rights ....
" Id. at 607-08, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618 (quoting
Reynolds v. 'Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
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right to vote, 177 the right to be a candidate for public office, 178 and other
related rights considered fundamental interests have a primary functionto allow citizens to participate in the creation of the laws under which
they live. But these rights will be of little avail to those citizens unable to
enforce the laws they have helped make. And as one observer summarized: "It is axiomatic that laws have little reality without the professional services of lawyers . . . to set in motion . . . the complex

machinery of judicial determination." 179 In this sense, the right to
counsel in civil cases is part of a small core of rights fundamental to the
functioning of democratic government.
Fourth, as observed above, this right is the prerequisite to enjoyment
of all legal rights. At bedrock, citizens possess "property" only in the
sense and to the degree they can file or defend a lawsuit enforcing their
"rights" to enjoy that piece of land, that automobile, and the like. 180
Similarly, any contract they form is a nullity absent the means to enforce
its terms in a court. The Constitution itself is a nullity for citizens unable
to invoke its protections in a lawsuit. It is difficult to characterize a right
which is so pervasive and, in effect, the essential partner of every other
legal right as anything but a fundamental interest."18
California currently discriminates in its implementation of the fundamental interest in the assistance of legal counsel. Only those with enough
wealth to hire a lawyer (or among those fortunate to receive the legislative charity of legal aid 182) can secure this fundamental interest, just as
only those who had enough money to pay the poll tax could exercise their
177. "[T]he political franchise of voting is . . .regarded as a fundamental political
right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886). See also Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 298 (1975); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667
(1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964).
178. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715-16 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144
(1972).
179. E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1951). See also the classic
study, R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (2d ed. 1919).

180. "Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made,
there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." I J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 139 (R. Hildreth trans. 1840).

181. This feature, in fact, is the primary reason cited in support of classifying the right
to vote as a fundamental interest. See note 177 supra.
182. At the present time, the California legislature has not chosen to provide any funds
for legal assistance in civil cases. The federal government provides a modest amount of
legislative charity to civil litigants chiefly through the Legal Services Corporation, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (Supp. V 1975). But this statutory program does not guarantee a
right to counsel even in theory and, in fact, its resources fall far short of the need. See
note 106 supra.
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fundamental interest in voting before Harper v. Virginia Board of
83
Elections.1
It might be argued that the state imposed the poll tax that conditioned
the right to vote while it is not charging the legal fees which prevent
many indigent Californians from enjoying "like access to the courts" or
their constitutional right to have counsel. But that argument is specious
on two grounds. First, lawyers are officers of the court who will be paid
for representing indigents only if permitted by the courts. 18 4 Hence, any
such cost is a barrier imposed by the state. Second, and perhaps more
significantly, the courts have held that they may compel government to
fund equal protection when necessary to effectuate an indigent's fundamental interest.1 85
B. Middle-Scale Review
During the past few years the United States Supreme Court appears to
have adopted a new level of review in areas not specifically designated
suspect classifications, but which deserve more attention than the rational
basis test can provide. In Craig v. Boren,186 the Court held that a law
discriminating on the basis of sex was invalid because it was not substantially related to an important state purpose. Some commentators have
taken this to be a new, middle-level test, since it requires not a compelling state purpose but an important one, and not a necessary relationship
1 87
but a substantial one.
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court or other courts will again
take up this standard or expand it to other areas,1 88 but the area of wealth
discrimination certainly seems fertile ground for doing so. Indigents have
already come to hold a special place in the mind of the Court as a
whole, 189 as well as with individual justices. 19 The Court is aware of the
183. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
184. See note 31 supra.
185. "[S]everal cases have held that where important rights are at stake, the state has
an affirmative obligation to relieve an indigent of the burden of his own poverty by
supplying without charge certain goods or services for which others must pay." Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 602, 487 P.2d 1241, 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 613 (1971) (citing
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).
186. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
187. See, e.g., Bice, supra note 34, at 702-03.
188. Id. at 704. Some courts seem to be using this test. See e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of
March 3, 1974, 427 F. §upp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (denial of equal protection where statute
denies punitive damages for wrongful death actions but allows punitives for personal
injury, property damage and libel actions where the tortious conduct is oppressive,
fraudulent or malicious).
189. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
190. See cases cited note 144 supra.
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plight of the poor and the fact that poverty may be a status thrust upon

persons. 191 It is not unlikely that the Court in the future will want to test
wealth discriminations under a standard of review with more teeth than
the rational basis test. 192 If either the United States or California courts
elect to adopt this policy, it would be difficult to imagine an "important"
state interest that is "substantially" furthered by the denial of free
counsel to low-income litigants.193
V.

THE POSITIVE MANDATE: THE DUTY TO PROVIDE EQUAL JUSTICE
TO INDIGENT CIVIL LITIGANTS

There is a further argument that partakes of the fundamental interest
test under the equal protection clause, yet transcends it. In fact, the
argument transcends the equal protection clause itself. In essence, this
theory rests on a contention that, taken as a whole, the Constitution
creates a right to equaljustice. This translates to an affirmative duty on
government to provide forums for the resolution of disputes which afford
citizens not merely a "meaningful opportunity to be heard," but a
"substantially equal opportunity to be heard"; not merely "access" but
"substantially equal access."
The analogy is to the "right to privacy" which the Supreme Court has
found in the overlapping emanations from the first, fourth, fifth and ninth
194
amendment provisions. As stated in Griswold v. Connecticut:
"[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. "195
191. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) ("We have come to recognize that
forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty.").
192. But see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1974).
193. Although one California court has indicated that the preservation of government
funds is not a compelling state interest so as to deprive a civil defendant an interpreter,
Jara v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 533, 541-42 (Ct. App. 1977), hearing granted, May
26, 1977, the fact that the case was granted a hearing by the California Supreme Court
vacates such a ruling while placing the argument squarely before the highest court of the
state. But there is ample authority for the proposition that saving money is not considered
a compelling state interest (and might not even be important in the constitutionally
required sense). See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (state's interest
in preserving unemployment compensation fund from dilution by false claims did not
justify restriction on granting unemployment compensation to Seventh-Day Adventist
discharged for refusal to work on a Saturday). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633 (1969) (saving money insufficient to justify an otherwise arbitrary classification).
In addition, as evidenced by the experience of other countries which grant a right to free
counsel to indigent civil litigants, the cost factors of such a system need not be overburdensome. The cost factors will be discussed in Part Two of this article.
194. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
195. Id. at 484.
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The right to equal justice is located at the intersection of emanations
from several constitutional provisions. The duty begins with the pream-

ble. To "establish Justice" is one of only five primary goals of American government set forth in that provision.196 It is reinforced by the
first amendment prohibition against measures "abridging . . .the right
'
• . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," 197
a

provision not well served by denial of lawyers where effective access to
one branch of government (i.e., the courts) requires such assistance.198
Similarly, the due process clause of the fifth amendment and its requirement of a meaningful opportunity to be heard is not furthered by any
proceeding in which lawyers represent a significant advantage, yet are

denied to one of the litigants."

And the equal protection clause of the

fourteenth amendment emanates a notion of like access to the machinery necessary to secure the protection of the laws. 2°°

Individual justices as divergent in philosophy as Earl Warren and
William Rehnquist have hinted at a specie of procedural right which does
not rest squarely on either the due process or equal protection clauses.
For Associate Justice Rehnquist, of course, it appears to be a limited

right probably no broader than the outer boundaries of due process and
equal protection. Nevertheless, he emphasized the following:
The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases
has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,. and
some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. Neither
Clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result
reached .... 20
196. U.S. CONST. preamble.
197. Id. amend. I.
198. As pointed out in NAACP v. BJutton, 371 U.S. 415,430 (1963), a case based on the
first amendment, "litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open... to petition
for redress of grievances." And in a subsequent decision the Supreme Court has been
more explicit, holding that "the right to petition extends to all departments of the
Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to
petition." California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
One commentator, in fact, argues that the first amendment alone provides a more "secure
and comprehensible foundation for a right of judicial access" than does either due process
or equal protection. Comment, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for
Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1071 (1973). Even this comment, however, recognizes that
the first amendment, unassisted, provides less support for waiver of counsel fees. Id. at
1066-67. Nevertheless, emanations from the first'amendment in combination with emanations from due process and equal protection may create a rightto equaljusticewhich does
require free counsel for indigents.
199. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
200. See notes 164-66 supra and accompanying text.
201. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974) (footnote omitted).
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Chief Justice Warren's hint came in his holding in Burns v. Ohio,202
striking down a twenty dollar filing fee imposed on second appeals by
criminal defendants. The opinion found that this financial barrier "has no
place in our heritage of EqualJustice Under Law. "203
But the most significant support for this affirmative duty to afford
equal justice is found in basic political theory. As the Boddie opinion
suggests, 2° the individual is assumed to surrender his natural right to
settle disputes through force or stealth only because organized society
offers a peaceful alternative in which he has a fair chance to prevail if his
cause is just. 205 Society, in effect, breaches that social contract when its
forums favor one citizen over another. The disfavored individual cannot
be presumed to have agreed to submit to an unjust sovereign. In this
sense, equal justice is the essential underpinning of the entire society, not
just this society but any which purports to rest on the consent of the
governed. 2°

Viewed in this light, the right to equaljustice rises above the traditional suspect class-fundamental interest analysis and similar constraints on
the judicial role. These tests grew up in deference to legislatures and their
presumed reflection of popular will. They also arose principally in the
context of substantive legal rules. Equal protection of the law, for
instance, has been construed to require that the substance of a law be
equal in its impact on various classes of citizens, not merely that the
mechanisms of protection be equally available and fairly applied. To
prevent undue tampering with the will of the majority, the courts have
202. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
203. Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
204. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971).
205. [P]olitical power is that power which every man having in the state of nature has
given up into the hands of the society . . . with this express or tacit trust that it shall
be employed for their good and the preservation of their property. Now this power
which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to the society...
is to use such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good. . . and
to punish the breach of the law of nature in others .

. .

. [This power] can have no

other end or measure when in the hands of the magistrate but to preserve the members
of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions. . . . And this power has its
original [sic] only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those who
make up the community.
J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. XV, 171, at 97-98 (T. Peardon
ed. 1952).
206. The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have the
Sovereign Power, that Justice be equally administered to all degrees of People; that is,
that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the
injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they
doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these,
does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a
Precept of the Law of Nature, a Sovereign is as much subject, as any of the meanest
of his People.
T. HOBBS, LEVIATHAN, Pt. II, ch. 30, at 385 (C. Macpherson ed. 1968).
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imposed their own self-discipline in the form of the suspect classfundamental interest requirements.
It certainly appears sensible to allow the legislature great latitude in
defining the substantive law. The social contract does not guarantee each
citizen that he will receive the same benefits as every other citizen.
Instead, it guarantees a right to participate in the creation of those
substantive laws. 20 7 But, as observed above, the social contract does
appear to guarantee equal justice when those laws are applied to decide a
dispute. 208 It is submitted that the courts, as guardians of the social
contract have a different, more dominant role in reviewing the adequacy
of the mechanism which society establishes for securing the protections
of the law. The deference implicit in suspect class-fundamental interest
tests and the like is simply out of place. Neither the legislature nor the
political majority should be allowed to disturb the delicate balance
essential to equal justice.
The courts have another reason for casting off this deferential attitude
toward the legislature. It is, after all, the courts' function-the resolution
of disputes-their processes and their rules that are at issue. When the
defect is procedural, or threatens the integrity of the courts' processes or
the soundness of their decisions, the courts have a special duty to review
closely and provide a remedy if at all possible. It would appear difficult
for the courts, in good conscience, to wash their hands of this sort of
inequality by throwing the responsibility and blame to the legislature.
Assuming the government has an affirmative duty to provide forums
for resolving civil disputes which offer ,citizens equal justice, has it
satisfied that duty in the present design of the legal system? More
specifically, for purposes of the right argued in this article, has the
government established a system which makes the assistance of lawyers
critically important and thereby disfavors those unable to afford to
employ counsel? The answer appears fairly clear.
The State of California, through its legislature and courts, has created
the causes of action, the defenses and the system of procedural rules and
207. "The citizen consents to all the laws, even to those which are passed in spite of
him ....
"J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. IV, ch. 2, at 113 (L. Crocker ed.
1967).
208. "These are the bounds. . . put. . . to the legislative power of every commonwealth . . . . [Tihey are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in

particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the
countryman at plough." J. LOCKE, supra note 205, ch. XI, at 81. "All, too, will bear in
mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that
will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which
equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression." T. Jefferson, FirstInaugural
Address (March 4, 1801), in I MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 310 (1897).
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processes for resolving disputes. For most disputes in the regular courts,
the state-created substantive rules are so complex that they can only be
mastered by experienced lawyers. Beyond the complexities of the substantive law the state-created procedures and processes of civil litigation
also are so complicated as to require the guiding hand of counsel throughout." ° Presumably the state could have chosen to resolve disputes in
simpler, less adversary forums.210 Moreover, California could have simplified many of the causes of actions, defenses and other substantive
law. 21' Of course, simpler, less adversary proceedings might entail more
expense for the state because of the greater responsibility for fact-finding
which would be placed on the judge. And the elimination or simplification of some substantive rights might make the resolution of disputes less
212
precise and sometimes even less fair.
Nevertheless, the central fact remains that the State of California has
chosen from available models an adversary system based on a set of
substantive, procedural and evidentiary rules with which no layman can
be expected to cope. Having made that choice, the state apparently
denies equal treatment when it refuses to provide the assistance of
counsel to a litigant too impoverished to employ his own.
The courts of at least two other nations have already considered the
constitutional implications of a complex state-created system of resolving
disputes. In Switzerland the right to equal justice is embodied in its
constitutional guarantee that "[a]ll Swiss are equal before the law.' '213
Over forty years ago the Swiss Supreme Court held that this constitutional "principle of [equality] before the law" requires that the cantons
provide a free lawyer "in a civil matter where the handling of the trial
demands knowledge of the law. ' ' 214 In a similar vein the German
Constitutional Court has held that the "equality before the law" provision of the German Basic Law requires the government to supply free
209. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of some of these possible forums, see generally E. JOHNSON, JR.,
V. KANTOR, & E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 120, at 39-76; D. MCGILLIS & J. MULLEN,
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS (1977).

211. For a discussion of some of the possibilities and problems of simplification of the
substantive law see generally E. JOHNSON, JR., V. KANTOR, & E. SCHWARTZ, supra note
120, at 7-8, 11-30, 77-85.

212. Id. at 84-85.
213. "All Swiss are equal before the law. In Switzerland there is neither subjectiou or
privilege of locality, birth, family or person." BUNDESVERFASSUNG, CONSTITUTION
FEDERALE, COSTITUZIONE FEDERALE [B.V., CST., COST. FED] art. 4 (Switz.), translatedin
TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 705, editors' note.

214. O'Brien, supra note 82, at 5 (quoting Judgment of Oct. 8, 1937, Arrats du Tribunal
F6d6ral [ATF] 63 1 209 (Switz.)). See also O'Brien, supra at 8 n.28 (citing Judgment of
Sept. 19, 1946, ATF 72 I 145 (Switz.)).
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counsel in certain categories of cases not covered by the legal aid statute
itself.21 5
The language and intent of the Swiss Constitution and the German
Basic Law appear virtually identical with the language and intent of the
United States Constitution. It would seem that "equality before the law"
embodies the same concept as "equal protection of the laws," "due
process" and like provisions. But it is difficult to contend there is
"equality before the law," "equal protection of the laws," "due process" or "equal justice" in any sense if counsel is denied to a litigant
because of his poverty in state-created proceedings where lawyers are
essential for effective assertion of legal claims and defenses. The Swiss
Supreme Court recognized this and imposed the responsibility of providing counsel to indigents on the governments of the cantons. Notably, it
did so even though Switzerland is merely a confederation and normally
reluctant to force a uniform rule throughout the nation. This reading of
the requisites of equal justice was reinforced when the German Constitutional Court arrived at the same conclusion as it reviewed similar language but in a different country with a far different tradition and a new
constitution. Significantly, virtually every other nation in western civilization through legislation now provides free lawyers to low-income
216
litigants in most civil cases in the regular courts.
VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The above discussion should be sufficient, it would seem, to suggest
that the California courts have a number of doctrinal grounds on which to
base a legally enforceable right to counsel for civil litigants. Among the
common law, due process, equal protection, and right to equal justice
rationales, there are no less than seven different theories that could be
employed.
The common law rationale offers a comprehensive yet flexible right
grounded on the nearly five centuries old English right to counsel in civil
cases. This right carries both the advantage and disadvantage of easy
modification by the legislative branch.
One due process theory rests on the significance of the consequences
implicated in many civil disputes and would allow a weighing of what is
215. Judgment of June 17, 1953, 2 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 336 (W. Ger.)
and Judgment of June 18, 1953, 7 BVerfGE 54 (W. Ger.), translatedin TOWARD EQUAL
JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 700, 697.
216. See TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 39 (referring to statutory guarantees in
Austria, Canada, England, France, Germany, Portugal and Sweden) and Ginsberg, The
Availability of Legal Services to Poor People and People of Limited Means in Foreign
Systems, 6 INT'L LAW. 128 (1972).
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at stake against the burden of supplying free counsel to indigent litigants.
The other due process theory focuses on the complexity of the machinery
actually established to decide most civil cases and would mandate free
counsel for all proceedings unless and until simpler forums (where
lawyers are banned or unnecessary) are provided.
The three equal protection theories all allow some balancing but with
great weight placed on the right to free counsel. One justifies close
scrutiny of any denial of counsel to the poor because wealth is a suspect
classification in California. A second also requires close scrutiny, this
time because there is a fundamental interest either in the substantive
rights to be litigated or in the opportunity to have the assistance of
counsel itself. The third would provide a middle level of review mandating counsel except where the denial could be supported by a rational
connection with an important competing interest.
The seventh and final theory invokes a right to equaljustice predicated
on the underlying theory and spirit of the Constitution as much as its
specific provisions. This right is extraordinarily broad and binding, yet
implements the rationale which is most consistent with the fundamental
assumptions of democratic government.
The California Supreme Court could adopt any of these seven theories
and dramatically enhance the position of the poor in this state. But no
discussion of a right to counsel in civil cases can be called complete
unless it addresses the non-doctrinal considerations which influence, and
may dominate, judicial deliberations on this issue. It would not be an
overstatement to characterize these considerations as a bundle of fears
many judges hold about what might happen if a legally-enforceable right,
in fact, were declared.
We have assembled a catalog of these fears from oral arguments,
various speeches by judges and a bit of speculation, among them: (1) the
fear of court overload; (2) the fear of frivolous claims and defenses; (3)
the fear of overburdening private lawyers with uncompensated work; and
(4) the fear of permanently over-formalizing the civil litigation process.
In Part Two of this article, to appear in the Fall 1978 issue of the
Review, we will expand on these judicial fears and attempt to demonstrate why, accurately weighed, they should not inhibit declaration of a
legally-enforceable right to representation in civil cases for California's
poor people.

